Kaikki kirjoittajan ffrc artikkelit

Finland Futures Research Centre (FFRC) is a multidisciplinary academic research, training, and development organisation. Our main goal is to create a responsible and sustainable future. Read more: www.utu.fi/ffrc.

Kansalliset syrjäytymistä koskevat dialogit ja vaihtoehtoiset sosiaalisen syrjäytymisen skenaariot

Jari Kaivo-oja:

Syksyn 2023 aikana kansallisissa dialogeissa koottiin kuvaa yhteisöistä ja kohtaamisista nykyhetken Suomessa. Tästä erittäin tärkeästä asiasta julkaistiin oma yhteenvetoraportti Valtiovarainministeriön toimesta helmikuun 2024 lopussa.  Valtiovarainministeriön julkaiseman raportin mukaan syrjäytymistä käsitelleihin dialogeihin osallistuneet kokivat huolta yhteisöllisyyden rapautumisesta erilaisten kriisien ja vastakkainasettelun lisääntymisen keskellä sekä yhteiskunnan ulkopuolelle jäämisestä koronakriisin jälkeen.

Raportin mukaan yhteisöllisyyden vahvistamisessa tärkeäksi koettiin tavalliset arjen kohtaamiset. Julkista hallintoa haastettiin ottamaan vahvempaa roolia yhteisöllisyyden tukemisessa. Nyt voidaankin hyvinkin kysyä, miten julkisen vallan tulisi toimia syrjäytymispolitiikassaan? Mitkä ovat vaihtoehtoiset toimintamallit ja mihin ajatuksiin ne mahdollisesti perustuvat?

Dialogien arviointien yhteenvedossa kuvataan osallistujien erilaisia tapoja hahmottaa sosiaalisia suhteita omassa elämässään. Esiin nousevat selvästi eri yhteisöjen kipupisteet ja kriittiset elämäntilanteet, joissa ihmiset ovat vaarassa pudota yhteisöjen ulkopuolelle. Dialogiin tähtääviä keskusteluja järjestettiin 68 kappaletta, ja niihin osallistui yli 650 keskustelijaa eri puolilla Suomea, lähinnä Rovaniemellä ja Helsingissä, kerrotaan loppuraportissa. Ikähaarukka ulottui koululaisista 80-vuotiaisiin. Keskustelut käytiin suomen, englannin, venäjän ja viron kielellä. Keskustelijat olivat koululaisia, lukiolaisia, opiskelijoita, maahan muuttaneita, eri alojen asiantuntijoita ja ammattilaisia, taiteilijoita, virkahenkilöitä, kuntien, hyvinvointialueiden ja järjestöjen työntekijöitä, vapaaehtoisia, freelancereita, yrittäjiä, vammaisia, työelämän ulkopuolella olevia, eläkeläisiä, vanhempia ja isovanhempia.

Jokaisen osallistuminen tähän syrjäytymistä koskevaan dialogiin oli erittäin tärkeää

Tämä tuore helmikuussa 2024 julkaistu dialogiraportti on tärkeä puheenvuoro ja vaatii varmasti lisääkin pohdintaa sosiaalisesta syrjäytymisestä suomalaisessa yhteiskunnassa. Nykyään elämme sellaista aikaa, jossa etenkin digitalisaatio, etä- tai hybridityö, erilaiset kriisit ja julkisten palveluiden uudelleenorganisointi vaikuttavat tapoihimme kohdata toisiamme ja toimia yhteisöinä. Tämän rinnalla meillä on yhä enemmän poliittisia ja yhteiskunnallisia haasteita, jotka jakavat ihmisiä leireihin. Kaikki eivät ajattele esimerkiksi digitalisaatiosta, keinoälystä tai vihreästä siirtymästä tismalleen samalla tavalla.

Ihmiset kokevat, ettemme välttämättä ole pitäneet yhteisöistämme riittävästi huolta, jonka seurauksena monet yhteisöt ovat vaarassa rapautua. Tarvitsemme ehkä kulttuurin ja ajattelun muutoksen, jossa yhteisöihin kiinnitetään enemmän huomiota, niihin panostetaan ja niitä myös johdetaan nykyistä tietoisemmin. Tällainen kulttuurinen muutos edellyttää yhteisötoimijuutta, eli ymmärrystä, kyvykkyyttä ja halua yhteisöjen rakentamiseen ja johtamiseen. Myös julkisella vallalla ja sen tarjoamilla palveluilla voi olla nykyistä vahvempi rooli yhteisöllisyyden tukijana ja mahdollistajana, sekä hedelmällisen maaperän muokkaajana kansalaisten omaehtoiselle yhteisötoimijuudelle.

Emme ehkä ole huomanneet olemassa olevaa ”yhteisöllisyysvajetta” yhteiskunnassamme. Tämän tyyppiseen huoleen Valtiovarainministeriön julkaisema raportti antaa aihetta.

Nyt toteutetut ja raportoidut dialogit tekevät näkyväksi erilaisia elämänkaaren vaiheita, joissa kuka tahansa voi kokea vaikeuksia kiinnittyä uusiin yhteisöihin. Samalla on havaittavissa suurta ihmisjoukkoa koskevaa pysyvää ja kasautuvaa yksinäisyyttä. Mitä enemmän yhteisöt rapautuvat, sitä voimakkaammin se iskee juuri haavoittuvimmissa elämäntilanteissa eläviin ihmisiin. Yhteisöjen rapautuminen myös heikentää sekä yksilöiden että yhteiskunnan kriisinkestävyyttä. Ns. yhteiskunnan sosiaalinen resilienssi on nyt koetuksella. Samalla luottamus yhteiskunnan toimintaan voi myös rapaantua salakavalasti. Tämä mahdollinen kasvava luottamuspula voi olla myös uusi demokratian tulevaisuushaaste.

Dialoginen jatkaminen skenaarioiden muodossa

Valtiovarainministeriön dialogiraportissa todetaan, että ”myös dialogien järjestäjien, osallistujien ja aiheesta kiinnostuneiden toivotaan hyödyntävän yhteenvetoraporttia omassa toiminnassaan”. Tässä blogiviestissä tartun nyt tähän viralliseen toiveeseen ja pohdin hieman raportin teemoja kolmen eri skenaarion kautta ja jatkan hieman eteenpäin raportin mukaista dialogia.

Helposti ehkä ajattelemme, että yhteisöllisyyden lisääminen automaattisesti johtaa sosiaalisen syrjäytymisen vähenemiseen yhteiskunnassa. Kuvassa 1 tämä yleinen ajattelumalli on esitetty skenaariona 1, josta voimme käyttää termiä ”perinteinen sosiaalisen syrjäytymisen hypoteesi”. Tämän perinteisen hypoteesin ja sen mukaisen skenaarion mukaan yhteisöllisyyden lisääminen johtaa selvästi sosiaalisen syrjäytymisen alenemiseen yhteiskunnassa. Tätä skenaariota kuvaa kuvassa 1 laskeva nuoli.

Kuva 1. Sosiaalinen syrjäytyminen ja yhteisöllisyyden kehitys.

Voimme myös miettiä vaihtoehtoisia sosiaalisen syrjäytymisen skenaarioita. Skenaario 2 on kuvassa 1 esitetty ”sosiaalisen syrjäytymisen epäselvyyshypoteesina”, jonka mukaan yhteisöllisyyden vahvistuminen ei juurikaan vähennä, mutta se ei myöskään lisää sosiaalista syrjäytymistä. Tässä skenaarion 2 mukaisessa tapauksessa kehitys etenee siten, että vaikka kuinka olisimme arjessamme yhteisöllisiä, se ei vaikuta sosiaaliseen syrjäytymiseen suuntaan, jos toiseenkaan. Tulos on niin sanotusti ”nolla” ja sosiaalinen syrjäytyminen pysyy samalla vakaalla tasolla. Syrjäytymisen taso voi olla matala tai korkea, mutta ei muutu suuntaan, jos toiseenkaan tässä skenaariossa 2. Vaakatasoinen nuoli kuvaa tätä skenaariovaihtoehtoa.

Kuvassa 1 on myös esitetty kolmas vaihtoehtoinen skenaario 3 eli skenaarioura, jossa yhteisöllisyyden lisääminen ehkä yllättäenkin johtaakin lisääntyvään sosiaaliseen syrjäytymiseen. Tätä skenaariota voidaan kutsua vaikka ”sosiaaliseksi kupla” -hypoteesiksi. Tässä skenaarion mukaisessa kehityksessä ihmisen voivat olla hyvinkin yhteisöllisiä omissa kuplissaan ja pienryhmissään, mutta tämä sosiaalinen ”kuplaantuminen” ei vähennä sitä mahdollisuutta, että jotkut kokisivat vakavasti syrjäytyvänsä yhteiskunnassa. Syrjäytymistä voi jopa tapahtua isossa mittakaavassa, vaikka ihmiset sinänsä kokisivat olevansa erittäin yhteisöllisiä. Tässä tapauksessa on mahdollista, että sosiaalisen syrjäytymisen koetaan lisääntyvän. On olemassa tämä paradoksaalinen kehityksen mahdollisuus.

Lopuksi

Tässä blogiviestissä olen hiukan jatkanut dialogin dialogia. Voi olla ehkä tärkeä tuoda mukaan dialogiin tulevaisuuden mahdollisten vaihtoehtojen ulottuvuus. Usein liian helposti oletamme, että yhteisöllisyyden ja sosiaalisen syrjäytymisen perusura on hyvin selkeä ja lineaarinen, mutta se ei ole välttämättä sitä.

Tämäkään blogiviesti ei ole dialogin loppu, vaan osaltaan toivottavasti uusien dialogien alku. Kansalliset dialogit ovat yhteisöteko: dialogeissa kansalaisilla on mahdollisuus kokoontua yhteen, luoda sosiaalisia siteitä ja lisätä ymmärrystä toistensa kokemuksista. Tämä jaettu kokemus on tärkeä osa dialogia. Seuraavissa kansallisissa dialogeissa keväällä 2024 keskustellaan yhdessä turvallisuudesta ja luottamuksesta. 

Tavoitteena on ymmärtää paremmin Suomessa asuvien ihmisten erilaisia kokemuksia turvattomuudesta ja turvallisuudesta sekä luottamuksen merkityksestä yhteiskunnassa. Näin dialogi toivottavasti jatkuu ja syvenee. Skenaarioiden käyttö osana tätä yhteiskunnallista dialogia on vielä alkuvaiheessa suomalaisessa yhteiskunnassa. Tämän tyyppisen laajemman yhteiskunnallisen dialogin kehittäminen on myös demokraattisesti toimivan yhteiskunnan kriittinen reunaehto.

Jari Kaivo-oja
Tutkimusjohtaja, Tulevaisuuden tutkimuskeskus, Turun yliopisto
Dosentti (teknologiaennakointi ja tiedolla johtaminen, Vaasan yliopisto & ennakointi- ja innovaatiotutkimus, Lapin yliopisto & yhdyskuntasuunnittelu, Helsingin yliopisto)
Professori (yhteiskuntatieteet, Kazimieras Simonavičius yliopisto, Liettua)


Taustakirjallisuutta

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Kuvituskuva: Ryan Tauss @Unsplash

About the musical Joki Turusta

Marianna B. Ferreira-Aulu

The story of the musical “Joki”, written and composed by Juuso Peippo, happens here in the Turku region, and the year is 2129. The city as we know today is not the same. Most of the lowlands have been flooded by sea-level rise, and the 7 hills around today’s city of Turku have become islands.

In the beginning of the performance the audience is taken to 2129 by a series of newspaper headlines, images of futures that compose the possible coming of events, among these famine, pandemics, wars, unstable energy systems, and finally a cultural-societal return to “Middle Ages way of life”. This way of life includes going back to an agricultural patriarchic society, where women have no voice or political rights.

Here in Finland Futures Research Centre, we also use the technique of newspaper headlines to illustrate possible future events. It is an easy way to grasp people´s attention and ideate possible futures. Jim Dator says the best scenarios are those that make us laugh. Could this post-apocalyptic future created by Peippo be laughable? Well, yes of course. Peippo and his artists brilliantly convey the tragic future scenario with a whip of humor, hilarious face expressions, plastic guns, and clumsy choreographies.

For me, the best piece of art is one that tickles your brains, get you out of your comfort zone, make you laugh and think outside your common mundane thoughts of the everyday. This, my friends, is done beautifully in Joki.

For every song, the background of the stage changed with a different image of “Turku in 2129”. I assume these were a mix of stock photos and AI generated images, but I do not know more at this point.

As a futures expert, it was annoying not to be able to stop analyzing the scenarios and just enjoy the show. I wish our department was invited to cooperate with them, and I am sure any of our students or staff would have done amazing consultancy work for the creation of scenarios and for the AI generated images of future Turku.

As an antiracist scholar, I missed the intercultural aspect of Turku being considered in the scenarios. They did talk about “Åbo peoples” as a different cultural group than the “Turunmaa peoples” – an analogy of Turku being today a bilingual city. However, what about the various other cultures that have always lived here? I find very unfeasible, and uncomfortable, that only ethnic Finns would survive to 2129…

Putting my activism aside, the main problem of the musical Joki is that they only have 2 performances. Their first show was yesterday, and the last one is already today. This is such a fun performance; I wish more people would be able to see it too.

The main message that stuck for me, is that power struggles, love, hate for the unknown or misunderstood, and family dramas are so fundamental human behaviors, it does not matter what setting of scenario, these stay the same in our society. In the end women save the day with preserved ancient knowledge and knowhow. The future is female.

If you have time for an extempore Thursday night activity, do not miss the final performance of Joki. More information in this link: https://www.linnateatteri.fi/events/joki-musikaali-turusta/

Marianna B. Ferreira-Aulu
Doctoral Researcher
Finland Futures Research Centre


Picture: Linnateatteri

Tulevaisuudentutkimuksen opintoja Suomessa jo 25 vuotta

Hanna-Kaisa Aalto:

Tulevaisuudentutkimuksen Verkostoakatemian (TVA) perustamisasiakirja allekirjoitettiin 2.2.1998. Maailman myllerryksen keskellä vietimme 25-vuotisjuhlavuottamme työn merkeissä ja järjestimme vain pienen verkkoseminaarin 29.11.2023 alumneille ja opinnoista kiinnostuneille kuulijoille.

Viisi vuotta sitten TVA:n historiasta kirjoitettiin tarkemmin Tulevaisuuden tutkimuksen seuran julkaisemassa Futura-lehden teemanumerossa 3/2018. Numero sisältää monia mielenkiintoisia artikkeleita, joten kannattaa lisätä se ehdottomasti vaikka joulunpyhien lukulistalle.

Marraskuun lopussa järjestetyssä, lämminhenkisessä iltapäivätilaisuudessa kuulimme inspiroivat puheenvuorot niin TVA:n alumneilta, entisiltä opettajilta kuin alamme pioneeriprofessorilta. Ilona Suojanen, sisäministeriön erityisasiantuntija, kertoi pandemia-aikaisista tulevaisuusopinnoistaan ja esitteli yleisölle sisäministeriön strategisen ennakoinnin mallia. Suojanen on tuttu myös onnellisuustutkijana ja halusi korostaa opintojen tulevaisuudenuskoa kasvattavaa roolia.

Aleksi Neuvonen, Demos Helsingin perustaja ja TVA:n entinen opiskelija ja opettaja, johdatti kuulijat tulevaisuudentutkimuksen tarjoamiin mahdollisuuksiin ja haasteisiin avaamalla omaa uratarinaansa. Kuulijoille hän halusi muistuttaa, että laadukaskaan tulevaisuuksien tutkimus, ennakointi tai tulevaisuusajattelu ei taivu suoraan päätöksiksi, suunnitelmiksi tai toiminnaksi. Siihen tarvitaan erillistä osaamista, prosesseja ja rakenteita.

Iltapäivän alustusosuuden päätti Markku Wilenius, alamme kotimainen ja kansainvälinen edelläkävijä ja maailman ensimmäinen tulevaisuudentutkimuksen professori. Wilenius muisteli innostuneena TVA:n perustamisvaiheita ja alkuvuosia. Mukana tuolloin ideoimassa olivat myös mm. professori Markku Sotarauta, tutkimusjohtaja Jari Kaivo-oja, Anita Rubin ja käynnistysvaiheessa korvaamattomana apuna suunnittelija ja koordinaattori Sari Söderlund. Ennakkoluuloton Tulevaisuuden tutkimuskeskuksen perustaja ja visionääri, professori Pentti Malaska teki tietoisia valintoja ja haastoi toimijoita ympärillään näkemään, miten kasvava ala ja tutkimuslaitos tarvitsevat jatkuvasti uusia osaajia, ja että näitä osaajia tarvitsee kouluttaa. Tehokkain tapa tähän oli lähteä isosti liikkeelle. Samanaikaisesti 17 yliopiston lähtiessä mukaan kehittämään akateemista opetustarjontaa, perustettiin TVA:lle kansainvälinen neuvottelukunta, jonka tehtäväksi annettiin monistaa verkostoyhteistyönmallia maailmalle. Tämä alkuvaiheen suuri visioiminen on mahdollistanut poikkeuksellisen isot, tuhansien opiskelijoiden osallistumiset opintotarjontaamme niin Suomessa kuin ulkomailla.

Iso kiitos näin pitkästä tarinasta kuuluu myös tuolloiselle 1900-luvun loppupuolen OKM:lle, ja sen ennakkoluulottomalle rahoitusmallille, perustaa Suomeen lukuisia opetusverkostoja, joiden yhtenä tavoitteena oli rikkoa perinteisiä siiloutuneita toteutusmuotoja ja luoda uusia yhteistyökuvioita yliopistojen välille. Tuolloinen rahoitus mahdollisti esimerkiksi silloin melko kalliitkin opetusteknologiset ratkaisut, jotka olivat uraauurtavia. Vuosituhannen vaihteessa puhelinyhtiöt rakensivat yliopistojen välille videoneuvottelusiltoja, jotta opiskelijat voisivat opponoida toistensa harjoitustöitä reaaliaikaisesti kuvan kera. Esimerkiksi Oulu–Tampere, Lappeenranta–Turku, Kuopio–Teknillinen korkeakoulu -siltojen rakentaminen ei ollut ihan napinpainalluksen takana.

Delfoi-opintoihin kokoonnuimme vuosittain paikan päälle Dipoliin Otavan Opiston silloisen johtajan Hannu Linturin johdolla. Modeemit pätkivät ja kuvia ei juuri lähetelty, mutta jotenkin vaan saimme ensimmäisiä tietokoneavusteisia Delfoi-tutkimuksia aikaiseksi. Internetin ja digitalisaation tuomat mahdollisuudet ovat varmasti yksi selkeimmin toimintaamme vaikuttanut muutosvoima ja alkuaikojen kokouspuhelinopetustuokioita muistelee enää huvittuneena. Moni muukin asia on matkan varrella muuttunut.

Ja paljon on myös pysynyt muuttumattomana tai muuttunut hyvin hitaasti. Tulevaisuusraportti on jokaisen niin kotimaisten kuin kansainvälisten opintojaksojemme opiskelijan ensimmäinen kokemus tulevaisuusopinnoista ja yhteisöllisestä tiedontuottamisesta. Raportti kasaa yhteen uskomattoman paljon tulevaisuudentutkimuksen perusteita, vaikka eivät opiskelijat niitä kaikkia välttämättä heti hahmotakaan. Raportissa tehdään aikamatka tulevaisuuden yhteiskuntaan useamman vuosikymmenen päähän. Osallistujat etsivät faktatietoa heitä kiinnostavasta ilmiöstä, metsästävät heikkoja signaaleja, harjoittelevat näkemyksellisen asiantuntijatiedon tuottamista, tutustuvat monien mahdollisten maailmojen ja avointen tulevaisuuksien ajatteluun skenaariotyöskentelyn avulla, miettivät kompleksisia systeemisiä muutoksia, osallistavat toisiaan ja joutuvat myös hyödyntämään luovuutta. Raporttiryhmä on poikkeuksetta monialainen ja osalle ensimmäinen kokemus monitieteisestä työskentelystä. Moni saa myös ahaa-elämyksiä siitä, kuinka paljon jokaista tarvitaan tulevaisuustyöskentelyssä ja millaista oma osaaminen jo on suhteessa toisten alojen osaajiin.

Tähän tarinaan on mahdollisuus kiinnittyä jälleen tammikuussa 2024, kun tulevaisuudentutkimuksen opintokokonaisuus käynnistyy viikolla 2. Lue lisää opinnoista ja lähde mukaan!  
Tutkinto-opetus TVA:n jäsenyliopistoissa
Avoimen yliopiston tulevaisuudentutkimuksen opinnot

Hanna-Kaisa Aalto
Koulutuspäällikkö
Tulevaisuudentutkimuksen Verkostoakatemia

Ennakoimalla vauhtia Tunturi-Lapin innovaatiotoimintaan 

Hanna Lakkala & Kaisa-Maria Suomalainen:

Miten harvaan asutun arktisen alueen innovaatiotoimintaa voisi kehittää ennakointia ja alueen äärimmäisiä luonnonolosuhteita hyödyntäen? Tätä mietittiin Whenever You Need Extreme -hankkeessa (WYNE 2021–2023). Hanke oli kahden Tunturi-Lapin alueellisen kehittämisorganisaation, Tunturi-Lapin kehityksen ja Leader Tunturi-Lapin vetämä EAKR-hanke, johon Tulevaisuuden tutkimuskeskus toi kumppanina ennakoinnin, tulevaisuudentutkimuksen ja innovaatiotoiminnan asiantuntijuutta. Tunturi-Lappi on yksi Lapin seutukunnista ja kattaa Enontekiön, Muonion, Kolarin ja Kittilän kunnat.  

Luonnon äärimmäiset olosuhteet kilpailuvalttina 

Hankkeen ytimessä oli kehittää innovaatiotoimintaa pitkien välimatkojen alueella, jossa yrityskanta koostuu suurelta osin mikro- ja pienyrittäjistä, sekä muutamista suuremmista yrityksistä. Suuri osa yrityksistä toimii joko suoraan tai epäsuorasti matkailun ympärillä. Lisäksi Kittilässä toimii iso kaivos, ja Kolariin on mahdollisesti tulossa kaivos.  

Tavoitteena oli löytää uusia tapoja hyödyntää kestävästi luonnon ns. äärimmäisiä olosuhteita yritystoiminnassa. Luonnonolosuhteet ovat alueen kilpailuvaltti, josta löytyy paljon hyödyntämätöntä potentiaalia. Toki esimerkiksi lumi, revontulet ja ruska ovat olleet Lapin matkailun kehittämisen lähtökohtia alusta asti. Tavoitteena olikin, että myös muista äärimmäisistä luonnonolosuhteista lähtisi syntymään uutta liiketoimintaa matkailun lisäksi myös muille toimialoille. Pidemmällä tähtäimellä tavoitteena on löytää jopa uusia, esimerkiksi biotieteisiin tai muuhun huippututkimukseen pohjautuvia toimialoja alueelle.  

Mutta mitä ovat Tunturi-Lapin äärimmäiset luonnonolosuhteet? Niitä ovat: 

  • Äärimmäinen kylmyys, lumi ja jää  (edit. Ilmastonmuutoksen vaikutukset tähän tiedostaen) 
  • Äärimmäisen puhdas luonto: tutkitusti maailman puhtain ilma, joka tarkoittaa myös erittäin puhtaita vesistöjä ja maaperää, sekä puhdasta keruualuetta luonnontuotteille 
  • Voimakkaat värit (ruska)   
  • Äärimmäinen pimeys (kaamos ja alueet, joissa ei ole valosaasteita tai vain vähän niitä) ja revontulet  
  • Äärimmäinen valo (yötön yö) ja siitä johtuvat korkeat pitoisuudet erilaisia ravintoaineita luonnontuotteissa 
  • Hiljaisuus ja luonnon äänimaailma  

Kaikki edellä mainitut luovat tutkitusti myös olosuhteet luonnossa koetuille hyvinvointivaikutuksille.   

Innovointia ennakointia ja tutkittua tietoa hyödyntäen 

Miten siis lähteä järjestelmällisesti luomaan uusia innovaatioita näistä luonnonolosuhteista Tunturi-Lapin erityispiirteet huomioiden? Päätimme testata luonnossa toteutettavaa rentoa innovointityöpajaa, joka tuo yhteen yrittäjät, aluekehittäjät ja muut alan asiantuntijat. 

Hankkeen aikana järjestettiin yhteensä viisi innovaatiotyöpajaa, joihin kutsuttiin asiantuntijoita pitämään alustuspuheenvuoroja valitusta teemasta. Myös tulevaisuudentutkimuksen näkökulmia tuotiin alustukseen. Nämä puheenvuorot olivat usein jo itsessään vilkkaiden keskusteluiden ja ideoinnin katalysaattoreita.  

Varsinainen työskentely jatkui pienryhmissä, joissa ideoinnin sytykkeinä käytettiin jokaista työpajaa varten räätälöityjä innovointikortteja. Yksi korttipakka sisälsi ennakointitietoa: trendejä, megatrendejä, ilmiöitä, heikkoja signaaleja, villejä kortteja ja tulevaisuusväittämiä. Toiseen korttipakkaan oli koottu äärimmäisiin luonnonolosuhteisiin liittyvää tutkimustietoa tiivistetyssä ja helposti ymmärrettävässä muodossa.  

 Onnistuneiden työpajojen taustalla olivat hyvät järjestelyt sekä tietysti puitteet luonnon helmassa. Innovoimme mm. Näkkäläjärvellä erämaan kyljessä pilkkien, riippumatoissa hengaillen Muonion metsässä ja kaamoksen pimeydessä Jerisjärven jäällä ja kodassa tulen äärellä. Jokainen työpaja oli oma elämyksensä, joka vei osallistujat luonnonolosuhteen ytimeen! 

Tarkoitus ei ollut tukea yrittäjiä pelkästään hankeaikana, vaan miettiä miten yrittäjät voisivat matalalla kynnyksellä jatkaa ideointia myös hankkeen jälkeen. Siksi julkaisimme yrittäjien pyynnöstä innovointioppaan kortteineen. Julkaisun voit ladata tästä.  

Mitä opimme? 

Luonnossa järjestetyt tapahtumat mahdollistivat aidot kohtaamiset ja ideoinnille välttämättömän luottamuksellisen ilmapiirin kehittymisen. Kohtaamisista ja yhteisestä ideoinnista syntyivät uudet ideat palveluille, tuotteille ja uusille yhteistyömuodoille. Hankkeen onnistumisia on, että yhdessä yrittäjien ja aluekehittäjien kanssa onnistuimme ottamaan ensimmäiset askeleet innovaatiomyönteisen ilmapiirin ja kulttuurin rakentamiseksi. Esimerkiksi se, että pallottelee ideoita tuntemattomien kanssa, voi olla monelle uusi asia. Ideointikorttien avulla työtä avoimen innovaatiokulttuurin edistämiseksi voi jatkaa omissa verkostoissaan 

Yrittäjiltä kerätyssä anonyymissä palautteessa korostui itse innovointikorttien hyödyllisyyden lisäksi uudet yhteistyöverkostot sekä uudet konkreettiset ideat uusille tuotteille ja palveluille, jotka pohjautuvat luonnon ääriolosuhteiden hyödyntämiseen.  

Innovointityöpajojen järjestäminen pitkien välimatkojen Tunturi-Lapissa ei aina ole helppoa. Yrittäjät ovat tiukasti kiinni arjen liiketoiminnan pyörittämisessä. Arjesta irrottautuminen kiireen keskellä vaatii sen, että yrittäjä aidosti kokee saavansa tapahtumista hyötyä. Lähes kaikkien yrittäjien arki ja kiire määrittyy alueella myös matkailusesonkien mukaan. Toisin sanoen, tapahtumat on järjestettävä kunkin sesongin välissä.  

Itse innovoinnin ja verkostoitumisen lisäksi tapahtumista tuli myös rentoutumispaikka kiireiselle yrittäjälle, ja tähän loivat puitteet luonto ja hyvät järjestelyt. Onneksemme hankkeen vetäjällä on pitkä tausta matkailualalta ja matkailijoiden viemisestä luontoon. Tämän kokemuksen avulla kokonaisuus hiottiin toimivaksi yhdistelmäksi ennakointi- ja innovaatiotoimintaa sekä matkailualan osaamista. 

Hanna Lakkala, FM (maantiede), projektiasiantuntija, Tulevaisuuden tutkimuskeskus 

Kaisa-Maria Suomalainen, VTM, projektiasiantuntija, Tulevaisuuden tutkimuskeskus 

Hankkeen Instagram-tili: @arktinenviisaus 


Artikkelin pääkuvassa työpaja riippumatoissa Muoniossa. Kuva: Terhi Tuovinen


Cross-pollinating Traditional and Critical Theory in Futures Research and Foresight Research

The Tradition of Dialectic Logic of Enlightenment and “What If” Science Challenges

Jari Kaivo-oja & Antti Ainamo:

With globalization and new technologies, local forms of knowledge, local traditions, and local legacies, these have all lost much of their valence. Traditional boundaries between industry and art (Dalpiaz, Rindova & Ravasi, 2016), between one style of design of planning and another (Jencks, 1986), between what is masculine and what is feminine (Djelic & Ainamo, 2005), political orientation (Fukuyama, 2022), or otherwise one’s identity (Fukuyama, 2018), these are not carved in stone as they once were, but uncertain and often ambiguous topics to be but imperfectly forecasted. In this time of fluidity and flux, the past and the present serve less as models for the future or for appropriate ways of thinking and acting than earlier.

Futures research and foresight research have more to gain from cross-pollination between one another than earlier. More specifically, we here propose how and why the most gain from doing so is to integrate two kinds of research, starting from framing in a matrix “critical theory” and “traditional theory”.

Critical and traditional theory

A distinction can be made between what is generally called “critical theory” and what is generally called “traditional theory”. In the following, we briefly review each one of these two theories in turn, integrate these theories within a matrix, add a time dimension as our novel contribution and, finally, propose new directions in and across futures research and forecasting research.

Through the sections of this thought piece, we take it that traditional-theoretical links between not only deductive logic and inductive logic but also between deductive and inductive logic, on one hand, and critical-theoretical phenomenology, on the other hand, are – or at least ought to be – very interesting. Further, we propose here why experts in foresight research, in particular, ought to be even more aware than researchers in futures research of the theoretical aspects at play in our times fluid and turbulent times. This is because of the so-called Occam’s razor, or parsimony, as it is also called.  First, let us briefly review critical theory.

Critical theory: Frankfurt School and its criticisms

Generally, critical theory is an approach to science with a goal transform society as a whole, taking as its starting point to ”examine the entire material and spiritual culture of mankind” (Shaw, 1985). Critical theory traces to the “Frankfurt School of Critical Theory”, founded in 1923 in Frankfurt, Germany, by Max Horkheimer. This School was originally a collection of researchers and philosophers that came together to study the application of Marxism to philosophy and society. The driving idea was Horkheimer’s examination of his personal wealth. At the same time, Horkheimer was witnessing and examining the juxtaposition of the bourgeois and the impoverished. The critical theory Horkheimer came up was (and to some extent still is) preoccupied with forces, which in his view falsely relied on “traditional theory”, failing to embrace future possibilities in his economy and society. Horkheimer’s emerging critical theory would be a left-wing precursor to Alexander’s (1962) right-wing juxtaposition of what is “traditional” and what is “modern”, decades later. Both Horkheimer and Simon in their particular ways strove to move forward with an overt of rationalizing forms of life so that these would ensure a more true, more free, and more just life than earlier.

Horkheimer and his associates were first associated with the Institut für Sozialforschung (Institute of Social Research) at Frankfurt University, and director of the Institute and Professor of Social Philosophy at the same university from 1930 to 1933. Horkheimer then, after Hitler was named Chancellor and the Institute in Frankfurt was closed, relocated to Geneva, Switzerland, where the Institute had a satellite office. In 1934, Horkheimer moved on, this time to New York, where he opened the Institute with the Department of Sociology at Columbia University. In 1937, Horkheimer crystallized what is critical theory in his essay entitled Kritische Theorie (Traditional and Critical Theory), defining it to be a social theory oriented toward critiquing and changing society as a whole, in contrast to traditional theory oriented only toward understanding or explaining one or another part of it (Benhabib et al., 1993).

Since then, critical theory has sought to develop a phenomenological perspective to discuss a large variety of social practices and social systems, without losing context of the whole. Critical theory has established itself as an approach of social philosophy that focuses on society and culture to attempt to reveal, critique and challenge power structures. 

Critical theory has never formed a coherent group of researchers, but the thinking has been multidisciplinary with emphases very different and heterogeneous from one another. Various critical theorists have postulated and examined the effects of big businesses, monopolies, electronics, consumerism, technology, and capitalism on human life and society. The work of these researchers has also explored human freedom and liberation in the context of slavery and the inhuman practices of societies.

In and across its various forms, critical theory has had a far-reaching influence on the fields of sociology, educational studies, ethics studies, philosophy, and cultural studies (Bernstein, 1976; Arato & Gebhardt, 1978; Apple, 1990; Anderson, 1992; Mann, 2008). There are also many big names in social research than Max Horkheimer associated with critical theory: Theodor Adorno, Herbert Marcuse, Erich Fromm, Jürgen Habermas, Walter Benjamin, Paulo Freire, Richard Bernstein, Axel Honneth, Judith Butler, and Rahel Jaeggi, for example, they have all worked in or with field of critical theory. These and still other critical-theory researchers have shared their work in a publication called the Journal for Social Research. According to Elliot and Ray (2003; cf. Sica, 2005), critical theory is today known as ”one of the most influential social theories of the twentieth century”.

With its original roots in sociology and literary criticism, critical theory argues that social problems stem more from social structures and cultural assumptions than from individuals. It has found applications in various fields of study, including psychoanalysis, sociology, political sciences, history, communication theory, philosophy, and feminist theory.

Still today, researchers of critical theory are critical of the effects of technology and capitalism on society. Thus, the Frankfurt School was and remains a significant exemplar a group of philosophers and social scientists. A huge variety of promising approaches in critical theory of politics are still very important today (e.g. Amy, 2021, 2016, 2007). We can nowadays credibly claim that we really need critical theory of politics, for example. Grand challenges in politics include how should we deal with populism. with uncritical identity politics, etc.  In and across these challenges, one of the key ideas in critical theory is that ideology and all kinds of “isms” are the principal obstacle to human liberation and social development (see Tyson, 2023; Mann, 2008; Held, 1980; Roth & Kaivo-oja, 2016; Kaivo-oja et al., 2017; Viia et al., 2017; Roth et al., 2017, 2018, 2020; Sverre & Kaivo-oja, 2018).

On the other hand, critical theory itself has also met significant criticism and by and objections from Bohmann and Sörensen (2022), for example, for not offering any clear scenarios or road map for political action (praxis), often explicitly repudiating any solutions. Critical theory has in this way supported neither futures research or forecasting research. Critical theory’s critics have noted that politics, in particular, is a blind spot of the critical theory. They have elaborated in detail the fundamental constellation of ambivalence of the early Frankfurt School on politics.

Another criticism of critical theory is that it has often failed to provide rational standards by which it can show that it is superior to other theories of knowledge, science, or practice. For example, Rex Gibson (1986) has argued that critical theory suffers from being cliquish, conformist, elitist, immodest, anti-individualist, naivety, too critical, and contradictory, all of these in many ways. Hughes and Hughes (1990) argue that Jürgen Habermas’ theory of ideal public discourse “says much about rational talkers talking, but very little about actors acting: felt, perceptive, imaginative, bodily experience does not fit these theories”. Some feminists argue that critical theorists “can be as narrow and oppressive as the rationalization, bureaucratization, and cultures they seek to unmask and change. (see e.g. Randall & Allen-Brown, 1996, 7–8).

The above kinds of criticisms of and objections to it mostly apply to first-generation Frankfurt School, while the issue of politics has been addressed in a much more assertive way in contemporary critical theory. As for Jürgen Habermas, it is beyond doubt that, despite the shortcomings of his work, he developed quite an impressive theoretical framework in his studies (see e.g. Habermas, 1969, 1971, 1974, 1984, 1987, 1990). In sum, there has been a lot of criticism of critical theory, much of it warranted. But it is by no means anything surprising in the field of human and social sciences, where it is normal that the best theories and studies are challenged and criticised.  In the social theories, any theory is developed through criticism. In any free democratic society, too, criticism is a central way of development. In the totalitarian societies, not much criticism is allowed. The task of enlightenment is still the unfinished, as more than one social-science scholars has noted (Connerton, 1980; Hullot-Kentor, 1992; Honneth, 2000; Gandesha, 2001; Adorno & Horkheimer, 2002; Fleming, 2012; Mitchell, 2014). Hegelian dialectic and dialectics of futures research, foresight research and anticipation studies, we propose here, can and ought to be part of this kind of critical thinking.

In synthesis, the question of “what is critical theory?” in our fluid and turbulent times, has answers from both a narrower lens and a broader lens. The narrower lens points to the work of people specifically historically associated with the Frankfurt School, which addressed social movements and human freedoms of the time. The broader lens frames critical theory as a perspective that can address human freedom in any historical period, such as the one we now inhabit.

In the decades since the initial development of critical theory, the framework has been applied to several social justice issues (see Sen, 2011). Feminist theory, critical race theory, and media theory all have roots in critical theory. We remind here that this kind of scientific roots is good to know also in the field of futures research and foresight research.

During this Millennium, Horkheimer’s critical-theoretical ideas about what is theory have become the subject of renewed academic interest. Philosophers of science and their colleagues have turned their attention also to the inspiration that Horkheimer took from his predecessors: Weyl and Husserl, forefathers of phenomenology and, in turn, Husserl’s interest in Medicus’s transcendental philosophy (see Sieroka, 2007; Husserl, 1989). At first, relatively little attention was paid to Weyl’s original ideas. Then, Scholz (2012) focused on Weyl’s ideas about vector calculus and the relativity of space. Lehtonen and his colleagues (2020) have shown how geographical space can be approached on a purely subjective phenomenon, rather than objectively. Schutz, Ainamo and Lamberg (2021) have taken a radical departure from deductive logit, focusing on the relativity of time-place dynamics from a vector-calculus perspective.

All of the above begs the question of how, then, does critical theory differ from “traditional theory.” What is traditional theory?

Traditional theory in its deductive- and inductive-logic versions

As Horkheimer (1937) notes, the human and social sciences have tried to mimic the natural sciences, some human and social sciences concentrating on facts, other human and social sciences on principles. Both share the same concept of theory. This kind of natural-sciences-inspired activities of fact-gathering and general principles have been operating much like the rest of life in a society dominated by industrial production techniques. The human and social sciences’ “market value” has depended on their imitation of the natural sciences and their methods. This traditional conception of theory remains the same in and across the more deductive and more inductive variants. Empirically oriented social evolutionary social theorists since Herbert Spencer (1897) William Whewell (1853) have held that society is too complex to justify seeking general principles right away. They, and many others following their exemplars, have recommended to analyse and assemble facts first and then do some comparisons to achieve a complete induction, rather than just abductively develop armchair theories. Abductive reasoning (which is also called abduction, abductive inference, or retroduction) is a form of logical inference that seeks the simplest and most likely conclusion from a set of observations. It was formulated and advanced during the last third of the 19th century by American philosopher Charles Sanders Peirce. Today futures research and foresight research are established field of knowledge with a wealth of methods and techniques. Foresight research and its pragmatic attitude and futures research and its normal focus on scenarios, however, as a rule, are based on induction or deduction methods.

Deduction and induction methods make looking into the future a form of conservative or traditional projecting of past and present probabilities onto the road of development lying ahead of us. Closed past or present scientific outlooks give promise to give birth to open futures, but the futures thus envisioned usually are little more than exercises in common organizational learning.

The conclusion of a deductive argument is always certain given the premises are correct. The output may consist of predictions or general statements, where predictions concern unobserved singular states of affairs, and general statements, such as empirical generalizations, concern universal states of affairs.

Deductive thinking is also known as deductive reasoning or deductive logic. It is a type of logical thinking that starts with a general or basic idea to reach a specific conclusion. This idea of moving from general to specific is also known as the top-down approach. This view of social theory descends from modern philosophy and deductive thinking, such as Descartes’s “Principles of Rules” or Clarke’s (1982, 2003, 2006) “analysis – simples – order – deduction”. In addition to deductive thinking, logic or reasoning, the other side of traditional theory is inductive thinking, logic, or reasoning.

In contrast to deductive logic, the truth of the conclusion of an inductive reasoning is an argument that is always probable, based upon the evidence given application to concrete problems. Universal propositions or experiential judgments or inductive or evident insights emerge from analysis of data. In traditional theory, inductive logic is a method of reasoning in which a general principle is derived from a body of observations. It consists of making broad generalizations based on specific observations (see e.g. Romeyn, 2004). The input of an inductive method includes a data set, usually consisting of observations, and possibly some further assumptions. Often inductive logic is linked to so called Carnap–Hintikka inductive logic (see Carnap, 1950, 1952; Hintikka, 1966, 1970; Carnap & Jeffrey, 1971; Hintikka & Niiniluoto, 1976; Hintikka, 1997; Hintikka & Bachman, 1991).

Any traditional theory in this view is a sum of propositions linked to one another as a system (basic and derived), where the propositions are derived from, are consonant with, or both, with facts. The theory consists of useful hypotheses – stores of knowledge (library analogy). In the field of futures studies many author discuss about ”scenario libraries” or “scenario data libraries”.

In partial contrast to both deductive and inductive approaches, an abduction-based futures research approach what proceeds from closed, imaginary future states to alternative, truly open theoretical frameworks or explanations (see e.g. Peirce, 1878; Josephson & Josephson, 1994; Niiniluoto, 1999; Carson, 2009; Campos, 2011; Patokorpi & Ahvenainen, 2009). 

A critical statement in this context is that it is possible that in the field of foresight research and futures research that we have not been investigating “what if” questions too much. Rather, we maybe ought to focus more on “what if” questions and reason more from such questions – abductively and critically. 

Now, next, let us turn our attention to how to integrate understandings of critical theory and traditional theory.

Occam’s Razor and Its Sharpness

The idea of Occam´s razor can be traced to Aristotle (384–322 B.C.), the Greek philosopher, who wrote in his Posterior Analytics, We may assume the superiority ceteris paribus [other things being equal] of the demonstration which derives from fewer postulates or hypotheses.” Another Greek philosopher, Ptolemy (c. AD 90 – c. 168), stated: “We consider it a good principle to explain the phenomena by the simplest hypothesis possible.” This kind of general approach can be applied to general theory of sustainable development with ceteris paribus assumptions (see e.g. Luukkanen, Vehmas, Kaivo-oja & O´Mahony, 2023) and to the scenario analysis of sustainability (Ravetz, 1997; Kaivo-oja, 1999, 2001; Kaivo-oja et al., 2001; Wilkinson & Elahi, 2003; Wilkinson & Eidinow, 2008; Wright & Goodwin, 2009; Lloyd & Schweizer, 2014; Thompson et al., 2012). It is always possible to postulate social and natural science scenarios as alternative hypotheses.

In the late 1950s and early 1960s, Ray Solomonoff, the largely unrecognized pioneer of futures research, developed his theory of ”inductive inference”, a branch of Artificial Intelligence (AI) that focused on probability and prediction; his envisioned AI machines governed by Algorithmic Probability distribution. The main idea of his influential traditional theory of prediction was observation-based prediction of the next symbol based upon a given series of symbols. Nowadays, such algorithms are very popular and developed, but is almost forgotten how and why Solomonoff (1964a, 1964b) founded his theory., based on formal inductive reasoning in a Bayesian framework to develop an algorithmic information theory. His “machine” generates theories together with their associated probabilities, to thus solve problems. Fundamental ingredients of the theory are the concepts of algorithmic probability and Kolmogorov complexity (see Rissanen, 2007; Kolmogorov, 1965, 1968; Vitanyi, 2013). As new problems and theories develop, the machine updates the probability distribution on the theories (Rathmanner & Hutter, 2011), essentially amounting to a mathematically formalized Occam’s razor.

The modern justification for Occam’s razor – in line with Solomonoff’s work – is that it is a direct result of basic probability theory. By definition, all assumptions in such a machine introduce possibilities for error. If an assumption does not improve the accuracy of a theory, its only effect is to increase the probability that the overall theory is wrong. Occam’s razor is also known as the principle of parsimony or the law of parsimony. Both Occam’s razor and parsimony are problem-solving principles that call for searching for explanations constructed with the smallest possible set of elements.

Recently, there have been many renewed attempts to further improve upon the works of Aristotle and Solomonoff in their respective times – to derive how Occam’s razor relates to probability theory. These recent attempts notably include those by Harold Jeffreys (Robert et al., 2009) and E. T. Jaynes (Jaynes, 2003). The probabilistic (Bayesian) basis for Occam’s razor is elaborated by David J. C. MacKay in chapter 28 in his book “Information Theory, Inference, and Learning Algorithms” (Kay, 2003), where Kay emphasizes that a bias in favour of simpler models is not always required or wise to reach valid findings in research.

These recent attempts build on Husserl (1933), from whom Horkheimer (1937) took it that any traditional theory is systematic and typically linked to the whole of propositions (like theory in natural sciences). Horkheimer also built here on Weyl (1927). Horkheimer shared Weyl’s idea that harmony and economy are necessary for a traditional-theoretical system. In traditional theory, formal logic as a model of reason is essential for theory formation. In traditional theory, theoretical fundamentals have tended toward mathematical symbolism.

From the perspective of traditional theory, classical 19th and early 20th century distinctions (Tönnies’s Gemeinschaft or community vs. Gesellschaft or society; Durkheim’s mechanical vs. organic solidarity; Weber’s culture vs. civilization) are questionable from the espoused focus on principles and fact gathering in traditional theory. These distinctions, which are more in line with critical theory than they are with traditional theory, are applied in also many scientific analyses and articles that build on traditional theory and methodologies.

Critical Theory and Traditional Theory in a Matrix, and Propositions for Further Research

We take it that, for future research, distinctions between critical and traditional theory, on the one hand, and beach heads for the cross-pollination between the two, on the other hand, are central. These distinctions are also very important in terms of specifying the scientific basis for statistical forecasting research and futures research.

As we well know, explanatory scenarios and normative scenarios are at the heart of foresight and futures research. Following Piirainen and Gonzalez (2015; cf. Martin, 2010), explanatory scenarios are related to the traditional theory of science we have briefly reviewed above. Normative theories are related to critical theory in the human and social sciences (ibid.).

Futures, foresight research and forecasting research enter here the picture in that they are both very strongly linked to the central questions of social theory and applied human and social sciences, which have been studied for a very long time, but also take in very seriously advances, and strong and weak signals about them, in the natural sciences (ibid.).

A recent challenging and important study in futures research distinguishes normative futures research not from explanatory research, but from non-normative and explorative futures research (Minkkinen et al., 2019). Normative futures research is seen as having three distinct frames (Minkkinen et al., 2019): (a) planning frame, (b) visionary frame, and (3) transformative frame (Figure 1).  Non-normative and explorative futures research – which the study considers “traditional theory” – for its part, is seen to also have three distinct frames: (1) predictive frame, (2) scenaric frame, and (3) critical frame.

In Figure 1, we portray critical theory as normative and traditional theory as non-normative and explorative. Note that, in Figure 1, the critical frame has three variants: predictive or different from what we see in the present (level of perceived unpredictability), scenaric and considering what might change (alternatives), and highly critic or question and even forecasting (level of pursued change). It is good to understand that a generic typology employs an inclusive understanding of foresight that does not draw sharp distinctions between explicit foresight, futures research and futures thinking in general (anticipation). Minkkinen et al. (2019) are interested in explicit anticipation rather than implicit unconscious anticipation (see Poli, 2017, 266–268).             

Figure 1. Six frames. Dimensions: Level of pursued change and level of perceived unpredictability.

These six frames capture different sets of assumptions and different types of foresight/futures research, which can be distributed to different actors in a foresight system. Minkkinen and his colleagues, the original authors of Figure 1, suggest that diversity of foresight frames is likely to be a critical element of successful foresight systems. We add that this requires understanding the diversity of foresight frames and the competence to bridge different orientation approaches of frames.

In Figure 1, building on the work of Minkkinen and his colleagues, we thus link critical theory with descriptive explorative futures research. This in partial contrast to how many other normative futures and forecasting researchers have suggested that futures, foresight, forecasting and anticipation research are both one kinds of variation of Frankfurt-school critical theory and traditional theory. Only few futures researcher refer to classical research findings and articles of critical theory and traditional theory as Max Horkheimer defined these frames of social sciences (see e.g. Benhabib, Bonß & McCole, 1993; Tuomi, 2019; Derbyshire, 2017; Szpunar et al., 2016; Dufva & Ahlqvist, 2015a, 2015b, 2015c; Ramirez & Selin, 2014; Alvesson & Kärreman, 2011; European Foresight Platform, 2010; Keenan, Loveridge, Miles & Kaivo-oja, 2004; Georghiou & Keenan, 2006; Wilkinson & Eidinow, 2008; van Asselt et al., 2007; Bishop et al., 2007; van Notten et al., 2003; Inayatullah, 1990, 1998; Jacques, 1990; Bradfield et al., 2005; Ahvenharju et al., 2018).

In partial contrast to the above researchers who have suggested that futures, foresight and anticipation research includes variations of traditional theory and critical theory, we below use the work of Francis Fukuyama, the renown Stanford University professor as illustrative of our ideas in our thought piece. That is a reason why we need to discuss more about Hegelian dialectic logic and its relevance for futures and foresight research and for general anticipation studies.  

Francis Fukuyama’s work as illustrative of fluid and turbulent times

Some inductive researchers have used to inductive logic to reasons from outcomes. After the fall of the Berlin Wall in 1989, Fukuyama announced in his ‘The End of History?’ that this event was a mark of the triumph of liberal democracy and an arrival of a post-ideological world, but also a ‘sad time’ as it had ushed in the demise of all utopias and utopianism.

When we interpret the idea of inductive reasoning and Occam´s razor as do MacKay and Fukuyama, we can apply this razor also in the field of futures studies:  we build “what, if” and exploratory or probability-based scenarios (compare to Hintikka & Bachman, 1991). But is the outcome-based reasoning of Fukuyama, for example, just a new right-wing argument in disguise? This is a question that in our view needs to be approached critically.

Of course, with the wars in Crimea and Ukraine, for example, we now know, by hindsight, that the end of history in Francis Fukuyama’s thinking is surely not an accurate assessment, a fact recognized also by Fukuyama himself. In the last twenty years or so, we have also seen the rise of Islamic fundamentalism, 9/11, the Arab spring, and New Cold War as proofs that ideological contests remain. What has come in the place of end-of-history thinking and end-of-history mental models are identity politics and new forms of populism, which prefer to separate values and facts, which often does not lead to very critical thinking.  Thus, any announcement that the great ideological battles between East and the West would have been over, that western liberal democracy would have triumphed and “history ended” must obviously be met with healthy scepticism.

We take it that Francis Fukuyama is but one example of those many social researchers that can be dubbed “court philosophers of global capitalism”. Consider that Fukuyama has discussed one’s identity issues (Fukuyama, 2018), political orientation questions (Fukuyama, 2006a, 2006b, 2008, 2022), choice of governance model (Fukuyama, 2004), historical interpretations (Fukuyama, 1999, 2011, 2014), and trust factors of societies (Fukuyama, 1995) and future developments and challenges (Fukuyama, 2002). We focus on Fukuyama here because he has drawn, and continues to draw, on the philosophy of Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel who, long time ago, defined history as a linear procession of epochs; that is, as a non-fluid process of change. For G.W.F. Hegel, technological progress and the cumulative resolution of conflict allowed humans to advance from tribal to feudal to industrial society.

Some historians (e.g. Fackenheim, 1967) have presented Hegel’s influence as being divided into two opposing camps of followers: (1) right-wing followers and (2) left-wing followers. Right-wing Hegelians, the allegedly direct disciples of Hegel at the Friedrich-Wilhelms-Universität, have advocated a Protestant orthodoxy and the political conservatism of the post-Napoleon Restoration period. Left-wing Hegelians, also known as Young Hegelians, have interpreted Hegel in a revolutionary sense, leading to an advocation of atheism in religion and liberal democracy in politics. Recent studies, however, have questioned this paradigm (Löwith, 1964; Redding, 2020). Of course, it is also possible to note that there are middle of road thinkers in politics, which are not clearly left or right-wing thinkers.  

Right-wing Hegelians “were quickly forgotten” and “today mainly known only to specialists”. Left Hegelians, by contrast, have “included some of the most important thinkers of the period,” and “through their emphasis on practice, some of these thinkers have remained exceedingly influential,” primarily through the Marxist tradition. For Karl Marx, the journey ended with communism.

For Fukuyama and his readers, the Hegelian journey was ending more than 30 years ago, and he was announcing a new destination: what we know we can call it Industry 4.0, Industry 5.0 society, Industry 6 society, and so on (Kaivo-oja et al., 2022; Bzhalava et al., 2022). While Francis Fukuyama himself has admitted that history did not end (Fukuyama, 2022), he still sees a clear destination in front of us. We, in contrast, a follow Lombardo (2016), according to whom a Hegelian dialectic logic is sound path to purposeful evolution. That is, we build more critically on Hegel than does Fukuyama, and propose there ought to always – or at least for the foreseeable future – remain a Hegelian dialectic as a part of futures-research-based consciousness.

Neither Francis Fukuyama nor we thus believe that history has ended. But where Fukuyama and we maybe differ is that at least we (and maybe he also) are witnessing is a never-ending neo-Hegelian model of history and a journey, with one advance or other event after another, learning about one’s shortcomings and those of others, learning about our caveats, and the like; witnessing emerging criticisms: developing antitheses to those criticisms, and emerging or appearing to emerge with a series of dynamic equilibria. That much we can predict of the future based on what we now know of the past and the unfolding present (which is a little bit more than in the early 1990s). We now can, with the help of A.I., for example, build multiple scenarios of how near and far-away futures will unfold and at what kinds of probabilities we may attach to these scenarios (see. e.g. Makridakis, 2017; Gruetzemacher & Whittlestone, 2022).

If we take Francis Fukuyama at his word, we should focus critically on key variables such as (1) power structures and geopolitics (Fukuyama, 2022, 2008, 2006a, 2006b); (2) formation of identities (Fukuyama, 2018); (3) interpretations of history (Fukuyama, 2014, 2011, 1992); (4) governance model analyses (Fukuyama, 2004); (5) key drivers of posthuman futures (Fukuyama, 2002); (6) political processes (Fukuyama, 1999, 1992); and (7) trust factors of societies (Fukuyama, 1995).

There is much room for critical qualitative and quantitative scenario analyses. The problems of humankind are very demanding and wicked (see e.g. Dixson-Decleve et al., 2022). The relevant question in foresight and futures research is how we must, or how we ought to, forecast or to prepare for futures that in all probability will differ from how our current ecosystems and societies are set up by us and by others. As noted in this short thought piece published as a blog text, we should pay much more attention to professional “what if” ­questions and analyses. If we don’t ask such critical questions, we may sometimes be very surprised positively (see e.g. Ainamo, Dell’Era & Verganti, 2021; Pantzar & Ainamo, 2003). But, perhaps more importantly, we propose asking such questions will probably serve to avoid many unpleasant surprises and crises by taking the time and effort.

A grand synthesis and alternative scenarios of problem-solving capacity of the humankind?

As a grand synthesis of our previous reflections and discussions, we can present Figure 2. This figure combines the Hegelian idea of dialectic historical development and problem-oriented scientific “what, if” thinking. 

The central message of this picture is that the quality of political debate depends on the ability of the political system to produce progressive syntheses after theses and antitheses, whether left or right or middle-of-the-roaders. The ability to produce syntheses depends on the scope and quality of critical thinking and the focus of critical discussion on really important issues and problems.

Figure 2. Hegelian dialectic: Political discussion, political evolution and problem-solving capacity and potential impacts of “what if?” critical antithetical questioning of each traditional thesis that is produced in research following deductive or inductive thinking.

As many critical thinkers have argued, populism can hinder rational political debate and thus weaken the ability to solve problems in politics. Populism can also decrease societal trust and make political decision-making very difficult (see e.g. Apunen et al., 2017; Bachmann, 2018; Herkman, 2019; Eatwell & Goodwin, 2018).

The creation of synthesises may also become more difficult in circumstances where confrontations characterise social debate and decision-making. For critical discussion, it is important to develop what-if thinking and thus increase the capacity to solve societal system problems. If this is not possible, there will be a big risk of a regressive scenario.

If high-level problem-solving capacity can be achieved, a desirable progressive scenario can be achieved. It is also always possible to end up in what we can call a “stable scenario” – a scenario where we are stuck at the same level achieved.  

Jari Kaivo-oja & Antti Ainamo

List of References and Background Reading


About the Authors

Jari Kaivo-oja is Research Director at the Finland Futures Research Centre, University of Turku. He is an Adjunct Professor at the Faculty of Science at the University of Helsinki (planning and management sciences of regional planning) and the Department of Social Sciences at the University of Lapland (foresight and innovation research) and at the University of Vaasa (technology foresight, knowledge management and applied research of digitalisation). He has been a researcher at the Strategic Research Council (SRC) of the Academy of Finland in Manufacturing 4.0 and EL-TRAN projects. He has worked in various foresight and innovation management projects for the European Commission, for the European Foundation, for the Nordic Innovation Centre and for the European Parliament. Dr Kaivo-oja is an active scientific reviewer and he has worked in 16 scientific journals and has very broad experience in scientific advisory tasks of the European Commission, in ministries in Finland, large corporations, and growth-oriented firms. He is also a conference reviewer of the Knowledge Management in Organisations (KMO) Conference, the International Conference of European Processes (ICEP), the Finland Futures Research Centre’s conferences (FFRC Futures Conferences), and the International Conference of the European Academy of Management (EURAM). In the years 1991–2023, he published about 260 scientific publications.

Antti Ainamo is Project Researcher in Civil Engineering, School of Engineering, and at CKIR, School of Business, both at Aalto University. Part-time, he is Associate Professor at Sandbox, Institute of Computer Science, University of Tartu. He also continues as Adjunct Professor at Aalto’s School of Arts, Design and Architecture. His earlier positions include those at Tongji University, Swedish School of Textiles, Oxford University Said School of Business, Umeå SBE, Stanford University, and London Business School. Dr Ainamo has worked in various foresight and innovation management projects for the European Commission, the Nordic Innovation Centre, Academy of Finland and Business Finland, and consulted companies such as Nokia and Kone. He has published in journals such as Organization Science, Industry and Innovation, Human Relations, Creativity and Innovation Management, Research in the Sociology of Organizations, and Scandinavian Journal of Management.


Image by Patricio González from Pixabay


Who Will Win the European Inflation Game Competition of Inflation Rate Differences?

Jari Kaivo-oja:

Inflation Advantages and Disadvantages of Finland in Relation to the EU Member Countries and U.S.A.

Data-based Analysis from July 2022 to April 2023 with Key Eurostat Inflation Index Numbers.

Future economic developments in Europe depend very much on the strength of inflation. If inflation is not contained, it could lead to a deep recession in Europe. This situational picture is such that it requires continuous monitoring in Finland and its economic decision-making. The positive thing for Finland is that we have been able to curb inflation despite the fact that we border Russia. This blog post presents a data-based situational picture analysis of Finland and the European Union, which shows that Finland has so far succeeded reasonably well in fighting inflationary pressures. 

Inflation is a real problem for consumers and investors

Almost all economists are agreeing about the negative effects of inflation. Inflation, hyperinflation, and deflation have all had profound effects on societies, especially during periods of war and crisis. As noted recently by Stephen D. King (2023): “We Need to Talk About Inflation”. Stephen D. King is a very influential economist who has published many popular books, He is the author of “Losing Control: The Emerging Threats to Western Prosperity” (2010), “When the Money Runs Out: The End of Western Affluence” (2013) and “Grave New World: The End of Globalization, the Return of History” (2017) and “We Need to Talk About Inflation”. All these books are interesting and professionally written books. He was the Chief Economist at HSBC for 17 years (Stephen D. King – Wikipedia).  

Today’s approach to managing inflation has been shaped by these episodes and informed by debates between different schools of economic thought from Irwin Fisher (Irving Fisher – Wikipedia) and Friedrich August Hayek (Friedrich Hayek – Wikipedia) to John Maynard Keynes (John Maynard Keynes – Wikipedia) and the monetarists. There are two major economic theories to explain the inflation process. (1) Demand-pull inflation and (2) Cost-push inflation.

While low and stable inflation can be beneficial for an economy by stimulating spending and investment, high and volatile inflation rates can have detrimental effects on economic stability, growth, and the overall well-being of individuals and businesses. One key problem of inflation is reduced purchasing power. When consumer and producer prices rise, the value of money decreases. This means that individuals and businesses can buy fewer goods and services with the same amount of money. As a result, people’s purchasing power is eroded, which can reduce their standard of living and limit their ability to save and invest.

Inflation has always negative impact on savings and investments. Inflation erodes always the value of money over time. When the inflation rate is higher than the interest rate earned on savings accounts or other low-risk investments, real returns become negative. This discourages ordinary people from saving and can lead to a decrease in investment, as individuals seek alternative ways to protect their wealth from inflation.

These kinds of facts are a fundamental reason to monitor the inflation rate trends of national economies. In this article, the main focus is on the difference in inflation rates between countries, which is important for price competitiveness. The differences are calculated relative to Finland’s monthly inflation levels. After all, the difference in price level always produces the possibility of arbitrage, which is considered very significant in economics. Large differences in inflation levels also create a price-based regulatory mechanism to contain inflationary pressures in Europe and maintain price competitiveness in the euro area. Price competitiveness and real economic competitiveness are key issues for regional and national competitiveness.

Inflation in Finland and in the EU-27 region in July 2022-April 2023

In this blog post, we assess recent inflation developments in Finland and Europe. There has been a worried public debate about rising inflation, both in Europe and around the world. In this sense, this blog post provides a timely insight into the debate on inflation developments in Europe.

First, I will present a figure 1 of inflation in terms of HICP consumer price development in Finland.

Figure 1. Inflation, HICP – monthly data index in Finland, July 2022-March 2023 (2015=100).

We can clearly see from the figure that consumer prices have risen significantly in Finland, but the development has been similar almost everywhere in Europe.

In Figure 2, I have compared consumer price developments with some other European countries and the United States.

Figure 2. Inflation, HICP – monthly data index in Finland, and in the U.S.A., Germany, Sweden, Poland and European Economic Area, July 2022-March 2023 (2015=100).

In this comparison, Finland fares surprisingly well. The development of consumer prices has been more moderate in Finland than in the European Economic Area, Germany and the United States.

Figure 3 shows a statistical indicator of monthly changes in inflation. The changes have been increasing to November 2022 (rate of change was 9), but after this peak month the speed of change has decreased to the level of 6. This is positive signal of change in inflation in Finland.

Figure 3. Inflation, annual rate of change, measured with HICP – monthly data (annual rate of change), All items of HICP, in 2022-07 (July 2022) – 2023-04 (March 2023) in Finland (Source: Eurostat 2023).

Figure 4 shows a comparative analysis of the rate of change in inflation in Finland and certain EU countries and the United States of America. This figure also shows positive developments in terms of inflation changes in Finland compared to these relevant peer countries.

Figure 4. Inflation, measured with HICP – monthly data (annual rate of change), All items of HICP, in 2022-07 (July 2022) – 2023-04 (March 2023) in Finland and some key European countries.

In Figure 5 I report inflation of producer prices in industry, domestic market – monthly data in Finland, for July 2022-March 2023. This figure shows that Finland has succeeded in significantly damming the growth of producer prices during this period. Inflation has fallen for these producer prices.

Figure 5. Inflation of producer prices in industry, domestic market – monthly data in Finland, July 2022-March 2023.

The figure 6 shows a comparative analysis of producer price developments. That, too, offers a very positive result for Finland.

Figure 6. Inflation of producer prices in industry, domestic market – monthly data in Finland, July 2022-March 2023.

Inflation Advantages and Disadvantages of Finland

We now turn to a comparative analysis of the inflation indicators for Finland and the EU countries. The aim is to assess the differences in the trend development of inflation developments between Finland and the rest of the EU. We look at differences in general consumer price HICS developments, HICS inflation change rates and producer price index developments. This section provides three different benchmarking analyses.

First, in Figure 7, inflation advantages of Finland in relation to some European countries and the U.S.A., July 2022-April 2023 based on HICP – monthly data (index) are reported. This figure 7 shows positive advantages in relation to consumer price levels in Finland.

Figure 7. Inflation advantages of Finland in relation to some European countries and the U.S.A., July 2022-April 2023 based on HICP – monthly data (index).

Figure 8 shows a clear picture that differences in consumer price inflation are quite large in the EU region. This figure reveals inflation advantages of Finland in relation to some European countries and the U.S.A. (July 2022-March 2023 based on HICP – monthly data, index).

The figure 8 shows that HICP consumer prices have developed strongly in the Baltic countries and Poland.

Figure 8. Inflation advantages of Finland in relation to some European countries and the U.S.A., July 2022-March 2023 based on HICP – monthly data (index).

In Figure 9, I report Average Inflation Advantages, minus index numbers and disadvantages of Finland, positive index numbers with HICP Index of Finland minus HIPC Index of other country, in July 2022-April 2023.

Figure 9. Average Inflation Advantages, minus index numbers and disadvantages of Finland, positive index numbers  (HICP Index of Finland minus HIPC Index of other country) in July 2022-April 2023).

The figure 9 shows that the development of consumer prices in Finland has been more subdued than in most EU countries. This figure shows that only Switzerland has succeeded clearly better than Finland.

Figure 10. Average Inflation Advantages, minus index numbers and disadvantages of Finland, positive index numbers  (HICP Index of Finland minus HIPC Index of other country) in July 2022-April 2023).

In Figure 11 I report Average Inflation Advantage of Finland, Measured with HICP – monthly data (Annual rate of change) with all items of HICP, in 2022-07 (July 2022) – 2023-04 (March 2023).  This Figure 11 of the pace and change in consumer market inflation also tells a similar positive story about the successful containment of Finland’s inflation rate.

Figure 11. Average Inflation Advantage of Finland. Measured with HICP – monthly data (Annual rate of change), All items of HICP, in 2022-07 (July 2022) – 2023-04 (April 2023) in Finland.

In Figure 12, I report Inflation Advantage of Finland, Measured by Average Domestic output price index – in national currency (July 2022-March 2023). This Figure 12 of  domestic output price inflation also tells a similar positive story about the successful containment of Finland’s inflation rate. In this comparison, too, Switzerland fares clearly better than Finland.

Figure 12. Inflation Advantage of Finland, Measured by Average Domestic output price index – in national currency (July 2022-March 2023).

Summing up

It is good to be aware that economic trends in inflation can change the competitive landscape in Finland, in the European Union and in the world. Finland should, of course, take inspiration from Switzerland’s monetary and economic policy. Benchmarking and results support this policy recommendation. See also How Switzerland beat high inflation; Why the Swiss economy is strong (cnbc.com)

The comparative benchmarking calculations now presented show that Finland’s current position in this comparison is not so bad at all. That is why we should continue to act rigorously in promoting consumer and producer price competitiveness in Finland.

We know that high inflation rates make it challenging for businesses and individuals to plan for the future. When prices are rising rapidly, it becomes difficult to accurately predict costs, revenues, and profits. All kind of economic biases arise because of high inflation rates. This kind of fundamental uncertainty can discourage long-term investments and economic growth as businesses become hesitant to commit resources in such an uncertain environment.

If inflation in one country, for example in Finland, is higher than in its trading partners, it can make the country’s exports more expensive relative to imports. This can result in a decrease in export competitiveness and a deterioration of the trade balance, leading to a negative impact on economic growth. The results of this blog text show that in recent months from July 2022 to April 2023, Finland has kept its inflation in control. However, there is always a risk of wage-price spiral.  Inflation can trigger a wage-price spiral, where workers demand higher wages to keep up with rising prices. As businesses and industries increase wages to meet these demands, production costs rise, which can further fuel inflation. This spiral can create a cycle of increasing prices and wages, making it difficult to control inflation and maintain stable economic conditions.

This kind of negative inflation wage-price spiral process can now be found, for example in Turkey, Hungary and Romania, Latvia, Estonia and Lithuania.  Baltic countries are now fighting back against inflation pressures and for example, Estonia has been quite successful (Estonia Inflation Rate – April 2023 Data – 1999-2022 Historical – May Forecast (tradingeconomics.com)). Also Latvia and Lithuania have shown more promising result in the battle against inflation (Latvia Inflation Rate – April 2023 Data – 1998-2022 Historical – May Forecast (tradingeconomics.com) and Lithuania Inflation Rate – April 2023 Data – 1993-2022 Historical – May Forecast (tradingeconomics.com)). Behind the inflationary pressures in the Baltic countries has, of course, been the Russia-Ukraine war, which has increased direct and indirect cost pressures in these countries, which border Russia.  

In a special inflation case of Turkey, we can talk about superinflation Is Turkey on the brink of hyperinflation? | Financial Times (ft.com). Future economic developments in Europe depend very much on the strength of inflation. If inflation is not contained, it could lead to a deep recession in Europe. This situational picture is such that it requires continuous monitoring in Finland and its economic and political decision-making.

The positive thing for Finland is that we have been able to curb inflation despite the fact that we border Russia. One of the reasons why we in Finland have succeeded in curbing price inflation may also be related to Finland’s recent NATO membership, but the matter should be investigated in more detail later. I’m not going to speculate on this in this blog post, but it might be worth exploring.

Jari Kaivo-oja
Research Director (Finland Futures Research Centre, Turku School of Economics, University of Turku)
Adjunct Professor (University of Helsinki, University of Lapland and University of Vaasa)
Professor, Kazimiero Simonavičiaus University, KSU, Vilnius, Lithuania


This blog post is related to the R&D project ”Sustainable competitiveness through productivity and digitalisation in Satakunta” (ProDigy), which has received ERDF funding (European Regional Development Fund) in 2023.


Background reading and references

Akerlof, George A. , Dickens, William T. , Perry, George L., Gordon, Robert J.  and Mankiw, N. Gregory  (1996) The Macroeconomics of Low Inflation. Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, Vol. 1996, No. 1 (1996), pp. 1–76.

Anderson, Chad (2023) The Space Economy: Capitalize on the Greatest Business Opportunity of Our Lifetime. A Guide for Investors, Entrepreneurs and Aspiring Professionals. 1st Edition. Hoboken, New Jersey: Wiley.

Barro, Robert J. (1995) Inflation and Economic Growth. Working Paper 5326. October 1995. National Bureau of Economic Research. Washington. The USA.

Desai, Raj M., Olofsgård, Anders & Yousef, Tarik M. (2003) Democracy, Inequality, and Inflation, American Political Science Review, Volume 97, Issue 3, August 2003, pp. 391–406. Cambridge University Press.

Eurostat (2023) Source dataset(s) from PRC_HICP_MANR, PRC_HICP_MIDX and STS_INPPD_M.  HICP – monthly data (index) [PRC_HICP_MIDX$DEFAULTVIEW]; HICP – monthly data (annual rate of change) [PRC_HICP_MANR$DEFAULTVIEW]; and Producer prices in industry, domestic market – monthly data [STS_INPPD_M$DEFAULTVIEW]

Fisher, Irving (1977) [1930] The Theory of Interest. Philadelphia: Porcupine Press.

Gillman, Max (2023) The Spectre of Price Inflation. Newcastle: Agenda Publishing Ltd.

Hayek, Friedrich August (2008) Denationalisation of Money. Reissued Edition. London:  The Institute of Economic Affairs. 

James, Harold (2023) The Economic Crises that Shaped Globalisation. New Haven and London: Yale University Press.

Keynes, John Maynard (2007) [1936]. The General Theory of Employment, Interest and Money. Basingstoke, Hampshire: Palgrave Macmillan.

King, Stephen D. (2010) Losing Control: The Emerging Threats to Western Prosperity. New Haven CT and London: Yale University Press.

King, Stephen D. (2013) When the Money Runs Out: The End of Western Affluence. New Haven CT and London: Yale University Press.

King, Stephen D. (2017) Grave New World: The End of Globalization, the Return of History. New Haven CT and London: Yale University Press.

King, Stephen D. (2023) We Need to Talk About Inflation: 14 Urgent Lessons from the Last 2,000 Years Kindle Edition. Yale: Yale University Press.

Romer, Christina D. & Romer, David H. (1996) Reducing Inflation. Motivation and Strategy. University of Chicago Press. Chicago.

Monetary Policy Generates Poverty: Unchecked it will be our Nation’s Ruin

Skillen M.D., Richard D. (2019) Monetary Policy Generates Poverty: Unchecked It Will Be Our Nation’s Ruin. USA.

Mankiw, N. Gregory, Romer, David & Weil, David N. (1990) A Contribution to the Empirics of Economic Growth. National Bureau of Economic Research. Washington. USA.


Cover picture: pixabay.com

Hesiod, Hypnos, Foresight, and Anticipation

Jari Kaivo-oja:

Hesiod and Hypnos

Hypnos (Greek word: Ὕπνος) was the personification of a dream in Greek mythology, the Roman equivalent of which was Somnus. He was the twin brother of Nyks, the night, and Erebos, darkness, and of Thanatos, death. Hypnos is depicted in ancient art as either a naked young man with wings on the temples or a bearded man with wings on his shoulders.

Greet poet Hesiod, a Greek poet who wrote about Hypnos and his role in Greek mythology in his epic poem “the Birth of the Gods” (Θεογονία, Theogonia), describing the ancestry and lineages of the gods in Greek mythology. The poem comprises 1,020 verses. The literary form of the Birth of the Gods became established in the 500s before the dawn of time. At that time, new parts were added to the poem, such as verses 901–1020 at the end of the classic poem. Traditions continued to develop even after the work of Hesiod.  

However, the work of Hesiod has often been used as a reference work for Greek mythology. Hesiod is generally regarded by Western authors as the first written poet in the Western tradition to regard himself as an individual persona with an active role to play in his subject. We can easily find the relevance of this special topic in the actor-network theory of foresight. Among other things, Herodotus considered Hesiod an authority regarding the names of the gods and their attributes (Herodotos: Historiateos II.53, Herodotus 1993).

From the historical perspective, Hesiod should be referred to as a basic fundamental source of narrative storytelling in the fields of foresight and anticipation. Abductive reasoning (also called abduction, abductive inference, or retroduction) is an elementary issue in storytelling and narrative thinking, and it is a form of logical inference that seeks the simplest and most likely conclusion from a set of observations. Abductive reasoning was formulated and advanced by American philosopher Charles Sanders Peirce beginning in the last third of the 19th century (see good motivation of this issue in Peabody 1975. Josephson & Josephson 1994, Peirce 1998, Walton 2001, Carson 2009, Milojević & Inayatullah 2015, Syll 2023).

In the of economic thought, Hesiod can be seen as a central source of thinking before Adam Smith and some scholars keep Hesiod as a father of humanistic economics (see Brockway 2001, Gordon 1975).

Futures dialogues, future-oriented dreams, and visions can be defined to be forms of socio-therapy

Quality of sleep has a very significant impact on human thinking, as sleep is essential for brain function and cognitive performance. During normal sleep, the brain (1) consolidates memories, (2) processes information, and (3) repairs itself. When we don’t get enough good quality sleep, our cognitive performance can suffer in various ways. For example, our ability to focus, pay attention, and concentrate can be impaired. We may also experience memory problems and have difficulty learning and retaining new information. Research has shown that sleep deprivation can also negatively affect our mood and emotions, causing us to feel irritable, anxious, and depressed. In addition, lack of sleep can compromise our decision-making ability, judgment, and creativity. On the other hand, getting enough high-quality sleep has been shown to enhance cognitive performance, improve memory consolidation, and enhance overall brain function. (see e.g. Walker 2017, Nelson et al. 2022). Quality of sleep is thus very important for human creativity and human understanding.

We should also see the importance of dialogue as a form of socio-therapy. Futurists are creating all kinds of dialogues and from this perspective, we should understand in a better way that these dialogues can be interpreted to be a form of socio-therapy (see Bohm & Edwards 1991, Bohm 1992). Only a few futurists understand their societal role as socio-therapists.

Hypnos and dialogical narratives

Greek mythology can often be seen as a starting point for dialogical narratives. In the context of foresight and qualitative anticipative storytelling research, one can always lean on classic stories and myths. Greek mythologies can be associated with basic human problems, challenges, and humanism.  

There are many good reasons to analyze Hypnos and Hypnos´s relation to foresight and anticipation research. According to some sources, the personifications of dreams, thousands of oneiros, would be descendants of Hypnos, but they are reported in older sources to be descended directly from Nyks (Hesiod, trans. 1914). Among them is mentioned as Morpheus, who announced prophecies in dreams, both Fobetor and Fantasos, which were sources of false visions and dreams. (See Ovid Books, 1922). Thus, Hesiod can be linked also to the pre-history of visionary thinking, foresight, and anticipation.  

The ability to dream is not a self-evident issue

In many ways, Hypnos symbolizes the importance of dreams for people and their decision-making. The ability to dream is strongly associated with dreams and their quality. Sleep is crucial for our brain’s cognitive functions, including memory consolidation and problem-solving. Getting enough restful sleep can enhance our ability to think creatively and solve problems, which can lead to more visionary thinking during our waking hours. Dreams and sleep are important components of visionary thinking because they allow our minds to explore and imagine beyond the constraints of our waking reality.

Dreams and sleep are closely connected to visionary thinking because they allow our minds to enter a state of creativity and imagination that is often difficult to access during our waking hours. Normally, during the dreaming phase of sleep, our brains are highly active, and we are able to create vivid and often surreal experiences that can be interpreted as a form of visionary thinking. Dreams can be a source of inspiration for artists, writers, other creative artists, and scientists, as they often contain imagery and themes that are both symbolic and deeply personal.

Hypnos, the legacy of foresight research, and anticipation theory

Anticipation and foresight are closely related concepts, but there are some key differences between them. Very often these concepts remain undefined and are seen as the same things.

Normally, anticipation refers to the act of expecting or predicting something to happen in the future. It involves recognizing a future event and making plans or preparations based on that expectation. Anticipation can be based on past experiences, current trends or patterns, or intuition.

On the other hand, foresight activities involve a deeper level of thinking about the future. Foresight involves considering multiple potential scenarios, analyzing the potential consequences of each, and making strategic plans to prepare for those possibilities. The “fully-fledged foresight” includes the choice of foresight methods, networking and stakeholder analyses, and models of decision-making. Foresight requires a broader perspective and a willingness to consider multiple perspectives and possibilities. It requires also a basic understanding of stakeholders and networks and decision-making criteria. The choice of foresight methods can be based on the FAROUT criteria (future orientation, accuracy, resources, objectivity, usefulness, and timelines).

Perfect rationality, imperfect rationality, problematical rationality, or irrationality?

In other words, anticipation is more reactive, and focused on a specific event or outcome, while foresight is proactive, and focused on anticipating and planning for a range of possible outcomes and their consequences. This critical difference leads logically to different relations to the Hypnos issue and especially to visionary thinking and leadership. Actually, it may be not easy to be very visionary, if we are focused only on a specific issue or event. As noted by Robert K. Merton Professor of Social Sciences (Jon Elster 1978, 1979) there is a descending sequence from perfect rationality, through imperfect and problematical rationality, to irrationality in human thinking. Rational explanation is not the same analogous thing as understanding a thing or phenomenon. We have seen many very problematic examples of siloed anticipation studies where a potential balance between reductionist and holistic thinking is not much questioned or less critically discussed (see updated discussion of Anderson 2022, Jackson 2019).

In Figure 1 we can observe three basic scientific approaches: the fully holistic research approach, the mixed holistic and reductionist approach, and the fully reductionist approach. All futures researchers (and maybe all others researchers too) should be aware of these three basic methodological alternatives.

Figure 1. A holistic research approach and a reductionist research approach.

We should always define, whether are we going to explain or understand human behavior because these two human activities are different activities and lead us to different methodological choices. A holistic research approach typically supports understanding phenomena, but a reductionist approach may help in explaining phenomena. Boundaries between these methodological approaches (solutions) are not always very clear and there are also boundary options (mixed holistic and reductionist approaches).

In the future, we may be more visionary with “fully-fledged three foresight pillars” of methods, network analyses, and decision-making models. As many times noted in various scientific discussions, a loss of one or two foresight research pillars leads surely to an unsuccessful foresight process. A deep understanding of methodological choices, network/stakeholder context, and decision-making model with decision criteria, is surely needed for a successful foresight process.

To summarize, anticipation is about predicting a specific outcome and taking action to prepare for it, while foresight involves a more comprehensive and strategic approach to planning for the future, considering multiple possibilities and their potential consequences. Hopefully, our bright and dark journeys in the Hypnos world will lead us to think about many alternatives, even surprising options, wild card scenarios, and not business-as-usual alternatives.

Unfortunately, Business-As-Usual (BAU) scenarios often dominate siloed and highly theoretical and siloed anticipation studies. It is good to be aware that whenever we abandon the use of many perspectives in the context of future-oriented research, we do not make use of holistic thinking and end up with siloed reductionist studies.

The most low-quality foresight research is to present the BAU scenario and almost identical other scenarios as supposedly alternative scenarios. I have noticed these kinds of problematic methodological issues in the context of several foresight studies (see for example, Kaivo-oja, Keskinen & Rubin 1997, Kaivo-oja, Rubin & Keskinen 1998).

Jari Kaivo-oja

Research Director, PhD, Finland Futures Research Centre, Turku School of Economics, University of Turku;
Adjunct Professor (University of Helsinki, University of Lapland, and University of Vaasa);
Professor (Social Sciences), Kazimiero Simonavičiaus University, Vilnius, Lithuania


References and background literature

Anderson, Monica (2022) The Red Pill of Machine Learning. Experimental Epistemology. Web:

Bohm, David & Edwards, Mark (1991) Changing Consciousness: Exploring the Hidden Source of the Social, Political, and Environmental Crises Facing Our World. HarperCollins. San Francisco.

Bohm, David (1992) Thought as a System. Routledge. London and New York.

Brockway, George P. (2001) The End of Economic Man: An Introduction to Humanistic Economics, 4th edition (2001), p. 128.

Carson, David (2009) The Abduction of Sherlock Holmes. International Journal of Police Science & Management. 11 (2), p. 193–202.

Dosi, Roberto (2017) Introduction to Anticipation Studies. Anticipation Science 1. Springer.

Elster, Jon (1978) Logic and Society. Contradictions and Possible Worlds. John Wiley & Sons. Chichester and New York,

Elster, Jon (1979) Ulysses and the Sirens: Studies in Rationality and Irrationality. Cambridge University Press. Cambridge.

Evelyn-White, Hugh G. (1964) Hesiod, The Homeric Hymns and Homerica. Loeb Classical Library, Vol. 57, Harvard University Press, Boston, USA.

Gordan, Barry J. (1975) Economic Analysis Before Adam Smith: Hesiod to Lessius (1975), First Edition, Basingstoke and London, p. 3.

Griffin, Jasper (1986) Greek Myth and Hesiod, in J. Boardman, J. Griffin and O. Murray (eds.), The Oxford History of the Classical World. Oxford University Press, Oxford, p. 88.

Hardie, Philip, Barchiesi, Alessandro, and Hinds, Stephen (1991) Ovidian Transformations: Essays on Ovid’s Metamorphoses and its Reception. Series: Proceedings of the Cambridge Philological Society Supplementary Volume. Volume: 23. Cambridge Philological Society,

Herodotos: Historiateos II.53

Herodotus (1993) Historiae. Volume II: Books V-IX. Third Edition. Edited by K. Hude. Oxford Classical Texts. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Oxford.

Hesiod, Homeric Hymns, Epic Cycle, Homerica. Translated by Evelyn-White, H G. Loeb Classical Library Volume 57. London: William Heinemann, 1914.

Inkinen, Sam & Kaivo-oja, Jari (2009) Understanding Innovation Dynamics. Aspects of Creative Processes, Foresight Strategies, Innovation Media and Innovation Ecosystems. Finland Futures Research Centre. Turku School of Economics. FFRC eBooks 9/2009. Turku. 

Jackson, Michael J. (2019) Critical Systems Thinking and the Management of Complexity. Responsible Leadership for a Complex World. First Edition. John Wiley and Sons. UK and USA.

Josephson, John R. & Josephson, Susan G., (eds.) (1994) Abductive Inference: Computation, Philosophy, Technology. Cambridge University Press. Cambridge, UK; New York.

Kaivo-oja, Jari (2017) Towards Better Participatory Processes in Technology Foresight: How to Link Participatory Foresight Research to the Methodological Machinery of Qualitative Research and Phenomenology? Futures, Volume 86, February 2017, p. 94–106.

Kaivo-oja, Jari, Keskinen, Auli & Rubin, Anita (1997) Eurooppa-selonteko ja tulevaisuudentutkimus [European reporting and futures research]. FUTURA, Vol. 16. No. 1, p. 6–15.

Kaivo-oja, Jari, Rubin, Anita & Keskinen, Auli (1998) Proaktiivisa toimijoita vai koekaniineita Euroopan tietoyhteiskuntalaboratoriossa? Lipposen hallituksen tulevaisuusselonteon kommentointia tulevaisuudentutkimuksen näkökulmasta [Proactive Actors or Guinea Pigs in the European Information Society Laboratory? Commenting on Lipponen’s Government Report on the Future from the Perspective of Futures Research]. Tulevaisuuden tutkimuskeskus. Turun kauppakorkeakoulu. FUTU-julkaisu 4/98, Turku.

Kaivo-oja, Jari & Roth, Steffen (2023) Strategic Foresight for Competitive Advantage: A Future-oriented Business and Competitive Analysis Techniques Selection Model.  International Journal of Forensic Engineering and Management. Forthcoming. ©Inderscience Publishers.

Keenan, Michael, Loveridge, Dennis, Miles, Ian & Kaivo-oja, Jari (2003) Handbook of Knowledge Society Foresight. Prepared by PREST and FFRC for the European Foundation for the Improvement of Living and Working Conditions. Final Report, Annex B, European Foundation. Dublin. Web:

Milojević, Ivana & Inayatullah, Sohail (2015) Narrative Foresight. Futures, Volume 73, October 2015, p. 151–162.

Moe, Sverre and Kaivo-oja, Jari (2018) Model Theory and Observing Systems. Notes on the Use of Models in Systems Research. Kybernetes, Vol. 47, Issue: 9, p. 1690–1703. 

Nelson, Kathy L., Davis, Jean E. & Corbett, Cynthia F. (2022) Sleep Quality: An Evolutionary Concept Analysis. Nursing Forum. Vol. 57(1), p. 144–151.

Ovid (1922) Metamorphoses. Translated by More, Brookes. Boston, Cornhill Publishing Co.

Peabody, Berkley (1975) The Winged Word: A Study in the Technique of Ancient Greek Oral Composition as Seen Principally Through Hesiod’s Works and Days. State University of New York Press.

Peirce, Charles Sanders (1998) On the Logic of Drawing Ancient History from Documents. The Essential Peirce, Volume 2, Selected Philosophical Writings (1893-1913), Peirce Edition Project, Indiana University Press, Bloomington and Indianapolis, p. 107–9.

Rothbard, Murray N. (1995) Economic Thought Before Adam Smith: Austrian Perspective on the History of Economic Thought, vol. 1, Cheltenham, UK: Edward Elgar Publishing (1995), p. 8;

Syll, Lars P. (2023) Deduction, Induction, and Abduction. In Jesper Jespersen, Victoria Chick, Bert Tieben (Eds.) Routledge Handbook of Macroeconomic Methodology. Routledge, London.

Walker, Matthew (2017) Why We Sleep. The New Science of Sleep and Dreams. Simon and Schuster Inc. New York, USA.

Walton, Douglas (2001) Abductive, Presumptive and Plausible Arguments. Informal Logic. Vol. 21 (2), p. 141–169.

West, Martin Litchfield (1966) Hesiod: Theogony, Oxford University Press. Oxford. 


Picture: Pixabay.com

Trends relevant to the NATO memberships of Finland and Sweden: Measuring political stability and to absence of violence and terrorism

Jari Kaivo-oja;

Political Stability and Absence of Violence and Terrorism in Finland and Sweden

In response to Russia’s invasion of Ukraine in February 2022, Sweden and Finland applied to join NATO but faced objections from Turkey, which joined in 1952. Alarmed by Russia’s violent invasion of Ukraine, a year ago, Finland and Sweden abandoned decades of nonalignment and applied together to join the Western alliance. NATO requires the unanimous approval of its 30 existing members to expand, and Turkey and Hungary have failed so far to ratify the accession of the Nordic neighbours (situation in 19.3.2023). Turkiey (or Turkey), a member of NATO, has developed a strong, diversified economy, but it has also experienced periods of political and civic turmoil between Islamists, and secularists and ongoing ethnic tension with Kurdish separatists.

Political leaders in Turkey have criticised Finland and Sweden for their weak counter-terrorism policies. We may ask whether there is any truth in these claims? The Worldwide Governance Indicators (WGI) project reports aggregate and individual governance indicators for over 200 countries and territories over the period 1996–2021, for six dimensions of governance: (1) Voice and Accountability, (2) Political Stability and Absence of Violence/Terrorism, (3) Government Effectiveness, (4) Regulatory Quality, (5) Rule of Law and (6) Control of Corruption.

I can use the indicator set produced by the World Bank (2023) as an indicator of Political Stability and Absence of Violence/Terrorism (PSAVT). In Figure 1 we can observe PSAVT Percentile Rank trend development of Finland and Sweden in the years 1996–2021.

Figure 1. Finland and Sweden: Political Stability and Absence of Violence/Terrorism: Percentile Rank Development in years 1996–2021. Source: World Bank. Worldwide Governance Indicators (Statistics have been read 19.3.2023).

We note that in Finland and Sweden, the development of this PSAVT indicator has been at a high level, but it has weakened slightly since 2014. In this respect, Turkey’s concerns have not been entirely unfounded. Finland and Sweden have reason to reflect critically on the success of their security policies because the PSAVT indicator trends have indeed taken a turn for the worse.

Political Stability and Absence of Violence and Terrorism in Turkiye

Figure 2 shows the corresponding PSAVT indicator for stability and security developments in Turkiye. We can see that political stability and security developments in Turkiye have been at a very low level (below percentile 25 since 2006). Since 2006, the PSAVT trend in Turkiye has been decreasing although since 2016 it has slightly improved. From this point of security policy view, Turkiye’s concerns in this regard are quite understandable. Obviously, political leaders do not want the development to go in the same direction in Finland and Sweden. That is what they really have wanted to be absolutely convinced of.

Figure 2. Turkiye: Political Stability and Absence of Violence/Terrorism: Percentile Rank Development in years 1996–2021. Source: World Bank. Worldwide Governance Indicators (Statistics have been read 19.3.2023).

We can also compare the average PSAVT indicator development of Finland and Sweden with that of Turkey and see the numerical development of the difference in PSAVT indicators. This trend comparison is reported in Figure 3, where we see the average PSAVT difference being around indicator units.

Figure 3. Turkiye ja the average of Finland and Sweden: Political Stability and Absence of Violence/Terrorism: Percentile Rank Development in years 1996–2021. Source: World Bank. Worldwide Governance Indicators (Statistics have been read 19.3.2023).

In Figure 4, we also separately report the difference between the indicators between 1996 and 2021. According to my calculations, the average difference has been 76.6 percentage rank points between 1996 and 2021. From this considerable PSAVT difference, we can conclude that Finland and Sweden will probably increase security in the NATO countries, and will not reduce it.

Figure 4. Finland and Sweden vs. Turkiey: PSAVT Diffrence in years 1996–2021. Source: World Bank. Worldwide Governance Indicators (Statistics have been read 19.3.2023).

A positive point for figure 4 is the observation that the PSAVT trend of difference (Finland and Sweden vs. Turkiey) has been downward-sloping trend.

In Figure 5, I have also reported the indicators concerning the regulatory quality and the level of the rule of law in Finland and Sweden. These worldwide governance trend analyses tell that these two important qualitative indicators of the quality of governance are at a high level in Finland and Sweden.  In this respect, too, people in the NATO countries have no logical cause for big concern, if Finland and Sweden are accepted as full members of the NATO.

Figure 5. Regulatory Quality and Rule of Law, Percentile Rank in Finland and Sweden in years 1996–2021. Source: World Bank. Worldwide Governance Indicators (Statistics have been read 19.3.2023).

Today top experts like Halil Karaveli, a Senior Fellow with the Central Asia-Caucasus Institute & Silk Road Studies Program Joint Center, has noted in the Foreign Policy (Turkey’s Problem Isn’t Sweden. It’s the United States. – Foreign Policy) that “Turkey’s Problem Isn’t Sweden. It’s the United States”. President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan has focused on Stockholm’s stance toward Kurdish exile groups, but Turkiye’s real demand is the end of U.S. support for Kurds in Syria. Today and a long time ago, many political leaders in Turkiye have feared what will follow the de facto establishment in Syria of an autonomous Kurdish region, Rojava, controlled by affiliates of the PKK, which has been waging an insurgency against Ankara since 1984. The leaders in the United States, meanwhile, have opted to back the Kurds over Turkish objections, because the Kurdish militia was an ally against the Islamic State and remains a loyal U.S. asset in Syria after the defeat of that group (see The Myth of Erdogan’s Power – Foreign Policy).

If we look at worldwide governance indicators, it is relatively easy to accept these types of critical expert reviews. Turkiye clearly has both domestic and foreign policy reasons for discussing Finland’s and Sweden’s NATO memberships, even though Finland and Sweden are very worthy members of NATO.

The latest international news tells that Turkey’s President Recep Tayyip Erdogan says his government will move forward with ratifying Finland’s NATO application, paving the way for the country to join the military bloc ahead of Sweden. President Erdogan has suggested that his country may soon ratify Finland’s application to join NATO. Erdogan hints Turkey may ratify Finland’s NATO membership – ABC News (go.com).

Finally, it is to be hoped that both Finland and Sweden will be accepted as full NATO members, as these countries have a lot of high-level expertise in good governance, democracy, and security policy in relation to many other member states. We need to pay real attention to political stability and to the absence of violence and terrorism in the decision-making processes of international global politics.

Jari Kaivo-oja
Research Director, PhD, Finland Futures Research Centre, Turku School of Economics, University of Turku; Adjunct Professor (University of Helsinki and University of Lapland); Professor (Social sciences, Kazimiero Simonavičiaus University, Vilnius, Lithuania)

Background reading and references

Booth, Ken (2005) Critical Security Studies and World Politics. Boulder: Lynne Rienner Publishers.

Buzan, Barry (2007) People, States, and Fear: An Agenda for International Security Studies in the Post-Cold War Period. 2nd Edition. Colchester: ECPR Press.

Howard, Douglas Arthur (2001) The History of Turkey. The Greenwood Histories of Modern Nations: Westport, Connecticut, and London: Greenwood Publishing Group.

Peoples, Columba & Vaughan-Williams, Nick (2020) Critical Security Studies: An Introduction. 3rd Edition. London and New York: Routledge.

Sayle, Timothy Andrews (2019) Enduring Alliance: A History of NATO and the Postwar Global Order. Ithaca and London: Cornell University Press.

Waldman, Simon & Caliskan, Emre (2017) The New Turkey and Its Discontents. Oxford: Oxford University Press. World Bank. Worldwide Governance Indicators (19.3.2023). World Bank Database.


Photo: Shutterstock


Planning the Recovery of Ukraine after Ukrainian-Russian War: Key Challenges and Big Strategic Questions

Jari Kaivo-oja:

Massive Ukrainian-Russian war and damage done

On February 24, 2022, the Russian Federation started to invade Ukraine, resulting in civilian casualties, displacement of millions of people, and widespread and significant destruction to homes, infrastructures, businesses, social institutions, families, and prosperous productive, and economic activity. The impact of the Russian invasion will be felt for future generations, with families displaced and separated, disruptions to human development, destruction of intrinsic cultural heritage, and reversal of a positive economic and poverty trajectory. (see The World Bank, Government of Ukraine, European Commission 2022).

Today we know after some calculation, as of June 1, 2022, direct damage had reached over US$97 billion, with housing, transport, commerce, and industry are the most affected sectors. Damage is mostly concentrated in the frontline oblasts (estimate is 74 percent), particularly Donetska, Luhanska, Kharkivska, and Zaporizka, and in oblasts that were brought back under government control (22 percent) such as Kyivska and Chernihivska. Most of the damage caused by the war is in the east of the country. (The World Bank, Government of Ukraine, European Commission 2022).

Disruptions to economic flows and production, as well as additional expenses associated with the war, are collectively measured as losses and amount to some US$252 billion. Ukraine’s Gross Domestic Product (GDP) shrank by 15.1 percent year over year in the first quarter of 2022, and poverty is expected to increase from 2 to 21 percent (based on the poverty line of US$5.5 per person per day). (The World Bank, Government of Ukraine, European Commission 2022).

Economic development before the Ukrainian-Russian war

In Figure 1, I report the GDP development phases of Ukraine in the years 1990–2021. We can see in it the effects of cyclical fluctuations for the 1990s and the financial crisis of the 2000s, but clearly the negative impact on economic growth after the invasion of Crimea, as the risks of the country’s future economic development increased.

Noteworthy for this figure is the fact that in 1990 the country’s economic growth was at the highest level for the entire long period, which reflects the destabilization of the operating environment of the national economy of Ukraine already in the longer term. In 2021 GDP in Ukraine was 535,6 billion international USD in constant 2017. For example, Finland’s GDP estimate in 2022 was $321.2 billion.

Figure 1. GDP, PPP (constant 2017 international $) in Ukraine, years 1990-2021. Source: World Bank Data 2023, 12.3.2023). In Figure 2 we report also the Gross National income of Ukraine, in 1989-2021.

Gross national income (GNI) is defined as a gross domestic product, plus net receipts from abroad of compensation of employees, property income, and net taxes less subsidies on production. This figure shows more clearly the strong economic fluctuations in the development of the Ukrainian economy. There has been instability and this has not eased the situation of the country’s citizens. If we judge the development of Ukraine on the basis of this indicator, we can see that the country’s development has been on an upward trend since 2000, although the negative impact of the invasion of Crimea can be seen here too, if we judge the development of Ukraine on the basis of GNI indicator.

Figure 2. Gross National Income in Ukraine in years 1989–2021. Source: World Bank 2023. Source: World Bank Data 2023, 12.3.2023).

Growing economic and human costs of the war

In a joint assessment released in August 2022, the Government of Ukraine, the European Commission, and the World Bank, in cooperation with partners, estimate that the current cost of reconstruction and recovery in Ukraine amounts to $349 billion (€349 Billion), which is more than 1.6 times the GDP of Ukraine in 2021. This means that the entire Ukrainian people will have to work for 1.6 years to repair the damage caused by the Russian invasion. However, this figure is expected to grow in the coming painful months as the war continues. We are certainly soon close to the value of two years of GDP. This situation poses a major economic resilience challenge to the national economy of Ukraine.

The Rapid Damage and Needs Assessment (RDNA) report (The World Bank, Government of Ukraine, European Commission (2022) lays out the financing needs for a resilient, inclusive, and sustainable recovery and reconstruction and provides a roadmap for planning. Over the next 36 months the RDNA assesses that $105 billion is needed to address urgent needs such as restoring education and health systems and infrastructure, preparing for the upcoming winter through the restoration of heating and energy to homes, support to agriculture, and repair of vital transport routes.

GDP per capita and unemployment in Ukraine before the war

We can assume that the GDP per capita level in Ukraine has dropped considerably with the war. The resources of the citizens are very scarce when it comes to going to repair again in a country ravaged by war. Figure 3 shows the country’s GDP per capita development as background information. Of course, it would be important to get close to the initial GDP per capita level of the war in the country during the repair phase, so that able-bodied people are strongly motivated to build the country and the national economy. It would be desirable to reach the level of $ 12000-14000 GDP per capita level quickly and improve it progressively as fast as possible.

Figure 3. GDP per capita, PPP (constant 2017 international $) in Ukraine, years 1990–2021. Source: World Bank Data 2023, 12.3.2023).

If we look at the development of the unemployment rate in Ukraine, the best situation in recent years historically has been in 2007 and 2008, when the unemployment rate was close to 6%. If we look at the development of the unemployment rate in Ukraine, the best situation in recent years historically has been in 2007 and 2008, when the unemployment rate was close to 6%. The potential for the future development of the Ukrainian economy is high since the population is well-educated and capable.

Figure 4. Unemployment, total (% of total labor force) (national estimate) in Ukraine, years 1995–2021. Source: World Bank Data 2023, 12.3.2023).

In 2021, the unemployment rate was around 10 percent. Of course, for the success of the recovery, it would be desirable to bring the unemployment rate to the lowest possible level, so that all possible resources of the nation are at the disposal of reconstruction. Based on the economic history of Ukraine, it can be argued that under favorable socio-economic conditions, it is possible to achieve an unemployment rate of even less than 6%. The critical prerequisite, of course, is the achievement of peace and the return to work of the fled migrant population.

Back to work after the war?

Key questions According to official UNHCR statistics, the total number of refugees from Ukraine recorded across Europe, are now about 8 108 448 (Situation 07 Mar 2023, Situation Ukraine Refugee Situation (unhcr.org)). There have been 19,293,161 border crossings from Ukraine and 10,823,841 border crossings back to Ukraine since 28 February 2022.

Figure 5. Population of Ukraine, years 1960–2021. Source: World Bank Data 2023, 12.3.2023). The population in Ukraine in 2021 is about 43 792 855 (UNHCR 2023).

A robust estimate is that percent of Ukraine people who are refugees is about 18,5%. The war in Ukraine has led to a serious humanitarian crisis and has caused the largest refugee situation in Europe since the Second World War. One challenging question for Ukraine’s economic recovery is how the workers returning to the country will be located in the future? How many people go back to Ukraine? Where do they return? What kind of jobs do they find employment in? How to get schoolchildren and students into education and studies? Whether they enter the urban labour market or the countryside labour market? There are many hard human recovery questions in the air.

The logistical issues related to the recovery plans are of a major nature. There are jobs in rural areas that serve food production, which is a very important source of export income for Ukraine. For economic recovery, it would be necessary to have enough manpower for agricultural product exports to pull the economy upwards. The same challenge applies to the tourism, hospitality, and experience cluster, which had begun to develop well in Ukraine before the war. The food production index shown in Figure 6, clearly shows how strategically important a sector of food production is for the national economy of Ukraine.

Figure 6. Food production index (2014–2016 = 100) in Ukraine, years 1992-2021. Source: World Bank Data 2023, 12.3.2023).

The agricultural sector is also a major employer in Ukraine. Figure 7 reports urban and rural population trends in Ukraine. We can see that rural areas have fewer and fewer populations which can be a challenging issue for future agricultural production.

Figure 7. Urban and rural population in Ukraine, years 1960–2021. Source: World Bank Data 2023, 12.3.2023).

In connection with the recovery plans in Ukraine, it is important to consider how the active workforce will be employed in different industries and services. Some of the most important industrial sectors in Ukraine include energy sector, metallurgical industry, chemical industry (titanium dioxide cluster), agriculture (grains, sunflower oil, and sugar), and ITC sector. Ukraine has a growing IT sector, with several tech companies and startups emerging in recent years. Ukraine has become an increasingly popular destination for outsourcing IT services.

The demographic structure is also an important background factor in this context. The figure shows the development of the working-age population (15–64 years) in Ukraine. in 1960–2021.

Figure 8. Population ages 15-64 (% of total population) in Ukraine, years 1960–2021. Source: World Bank Data 2023, 12.3.2023).

Paying attention to trust and public governance

When planning the economic reconstruction of Ukraine, it is important to invest in the management of public finances and fiscal budgeting. Figure 9 shows the development of tax revenues in Ukraine. It reflects the fact that the development of tax revenues has been on the rise and the country’s financial planning has been developing in a positive direction.

Figure 9. Taxes on income, profits and capital gains (current LCU) in Ukraine, years 1999–2021. Source: World Bank Data 2023, 12.3.2023).

The central government debt will be a challenging question in Ukraine in the coming years. In Figure 9 we figure out central government debt development in Ukraine from 2008 to 2021. We can forecast that the debt rate will increase in the coming years. The National Recovery Plan estimated that both EU partner grants and private investment grants will be needed in the future.

Figure 10. Central government debt, total (% of GDP) in Ukraine, years 2008–2021. Source: World Bank Data 2023, 12.3.2023).

In the future, Ukrainian decision-makers will have to pay attention to their administrative governance structures, because the World Governance indicator analyses published by the World Bank indicate that there is still much room for improvement in this important area, as the WG indicators are in the red, in negative numbers. Factors related to trust are not trivial when decision-makers are seriously planning to rebuild the country.

Figure 11 summarizes the development of the five key governance indicators from 1996 to 2021.

Figure 11. Worldwide Governance Indicators, Ukraine, years 1996–2021. Source: World Bank (2023) Worldwide Governance Indicators Database.

Thus, the World Governance indicator analyses indicate that much is needed when Ukraine is more closely aligned with European Union standards of governance in relation to corruption, effectiveness, political stability, regulatory quality, and rule of law. There are already ongoing efforts by the Government of Ukraine to lead the country toward recovery and reconstruction. In July 2022, Ukraine presented a US$750 billion Recovery Plan. Under the Ukraine Recovery Vision, US$150–250 billion is envisaged for restoration and modernization of housing and infrastructure.

A three-stage reconstruction plan was presented: Stage 1 is a plan blueprint; Stage 2 is a plan drill-down and roadmap; and Stage 3 is implementation. The Recovery Plan has set targets for 2032 and (1) it aims to accelerate sustainable economic growth with a plan for 7 percent annual GDP growth and an increase in investments, (2) to reach the top-25 economies in the Economic Complexity Index and the World Bank Human Capital Index; (3) and to achieve a 65 percent reduction in CO2 emissions from 1990. In general terms, Ukraine aims to develop itself towards European standards before 2032 and be a member of the European Union.

The size of alternative recovery plans for Ukraine?

In Figure 12, I have figured out current alternative recovery plans, lower and higher estimates for Ukraine, for the years 2022–2032.

Figure 12. Partner grants, Partner debt, and private investments. Alternative Recovery Plans, Lower and Higher Estimates, Ukraine, years 2022–2032. Source: Ukraine’s National Recovery Plan. National Recovery Council, p. 12).

In Figure 13 I have figured out our two estimates of the Recovery Plans of Ukraine, for years 2022–2032. The lower estimate is over 600 billion USD and the higher estimate is over 800 billion USD.

Figure 13. Alternative Recovery Plans, Lower and Higher Estimates, Ukraine, years 2022–2032. Source: Ukraine’s National Recovery Plan. National Recovery Council 2022, p. 12).

These economic and social recovery plans for Ukraine indicate that the size of the final price tag is not yet entirely clear. In any case, the scale of the stimulus package is large and will require a lot of planning and big political decisions. It is clear that the continuation of the war will inevitably lead to an increase in the resources needed for recovery. It makes the planning and implementation of the recovery a challenging planning problem, which inevitably involves a lot of uncertainties and risks. One critical factor will be the resources and personnel needs of the Ukrainian military in the future. It is obvious that, after the war, the state of readiness of the armed forces will have to be maintained for security reasons. In practice, this should mean that the resources of army personnel must also be used to rebuild the country.

How the economic recovery of Ukrainian-Russian war should be planned?

My Question to Open AI, New chat (openai.com)

“The economic recovery of the Ukrainian-Russian war will require a comprehensive plan that addresses both the short-term and long-term needs of the country. Here are some key steps that could be taken:

Stabilize the economy: The first priority will be to stabilize the economy by addressing immediate issues such as inflation, currency fluctuations, and capital flight. This may require the assistance of international financial institutions, such as the International Monetary Fund (IMF).

Rebuild infrastructure: The war has left many parts of the country in ruins, and significant investment will be needed to rebuild infrastructure such as roads, bridges, and buildings. This will provide employment opportunities and help to kickstart economic growth.

Diversify the economy: Ukraine has traditionally relied heavily on exports of raw materials such as coal, steel, and agricultural products. To ensure long-term economic sustainability, the country will need to diversify its economy by developing new industries, such as technology and services.

Encourage foreign investment: Ukraine has a large, well-educated workforce and significant potential for growth, making it an attractive destination for foreign investment. The government should work to create a favorable investment climate by reducing bureaucracy, addressing corruption, and offering tax incentives to foreign investors.

Focus on innovation: Ukraine has a strong tradition of scientific research, and the government should work to support innovation in sectors such as biotechnology, renewable energy, and advanced manufacturing.

Invest in education: To support a knowledge-based economy, Ukraine will need to invest in education and skills training. This will help to ensure that the country has a well-educated workforce that can compete in the global marketplace.

Address social issues: The war has had a profound impact on the social fabric of the country, with many people experiencing displacement, trauma, and loss. The government will need to address these issues by providing social services, mental health support, and opportunities for reconciliation and healing.

Overall, the economic recovery of Ukraine from the war will require a sustained effort from both the government and the private sector. It will also require the support of the international community, including financial assistance and technical expertise.”

I would estimate that these guidelines produced by artificial intelligence are relevant.

Jari Kaivo-oja
Research Director, PhD, Finland Futures Research Centre, Turku School of Economics, University of Turku;
Adjunct Professor (University of Helsinki, University of Lapland, and University of Vaasa);
Professor (Social Sciences, Kazimiero Simonavičiaus University, Vilnius, Lithuania)


References

National Recovery Council (2022) Ukraine’s National Recovery Plan. July 2022.

Open AI: ChatGPT March 13, 2023, New chat (openai.com)

UNHCR (2023) Situation Ukraine Refugee Situation (unhcr.org)

World Bank, Government of Ukraine, European Commission (2022) Ukraine Rapid Damage and Needs Assessment Report. August 2022.

World Bank (2023) DataBank | The World Bank.

World Bank (2023) Worldwide Governance Indicators | DataBank (worldbank.org)


Photo: Destruction in Ukraine, Unsplash.com


Good Business in Industries Needs Good Human Factors Knowledge and Management

Jan Dul & Jari Kaivo-oja:

Grand challenges in the industry in the Industry 4.0 era

Under the banner of ‘Industry 4.0’ a new industrial revolution is unfolding. New technologies and digital transformation force manufacturing companies to prepare for the future and to utilize new technologies for ensuring their competitiveness in markets. The road to a successful end result crosses a jungle of different new technologies, new possibilities of digitalization, and changing roles of humans. For survival, companies need new strategies and plan to reach their targets. Is the Finnish industry ready for this?

To be able to answer this question we need to ask if our “national machine” (ministry, decision-makers in industry, education institutes, politics, and the public opinion) is prepared for this inevitable change in industries. We already know that the industry sectors must acquire new technologies and make steps towards digitization. We also know that there is a huge need for increasing people’s skills and competencies in the industry to work with these novel technologies like Industrial and Service Internet of Things, AI, AR/VR, Cloud computing, Digital Twin tech set, Blockchain, sensory technology, 3D printing of different components, cobots for helping humans at work, Food security. Nanosensors in packaging to detect salmonella and other contaminants in food etc.

We also know the challenges of an aging workforce and the awareness that technologies take over many human work tasks, and at the same time, new roles and work tasks are coming for humans. Technological and human challenges go hand in hand and the human factor will remain a core element of a successful Finnish industry. Now there is a need for integrated humans and systems approach in the design and management of production systems and of future work. This allows to maximally use of the potential of humans as being part of the production system. This knowledge is largely available in the human factors and ergonomics field and can readily be applied in the Finnish industry.

In economic terms, low quality of integration of human factors creates a negative effect on the national economy e.g. due to inefficiency of the systems and cost of bad working conditions. Although we are economically and socially developed we are ergonomically undeveloped. This is not only a question of money but attitude and capability to utilize HFE (Human Factors Engineering) knowledge in general. The critical question is who will compensate for this kind of broad-scale negative effect in society or are just sending a high-cost bill to taxpayers?

For being successful we need to nurture this unused human potential in the right way. When designing or changing production systems we must ensure a mutual development of technology and manufacturing processes by using human factors in design for ensuring a good fit between the two human and the work systems, not only in large companies but also in small and medium-sized companies.  Do we have capabilities for making this happen at the national, industry, and company level? The simple answer is “no”. At the national level, industrial policies for technological development by the ministry of economic affairs (e.g. Renewing and Competent Finland 2021−2027 Program, TEM industrial sectoral reports, AI 2.0 Report etc.) are quite isolated from social policies for human development by the ministry of health and labor (e.g., future of work where integration of HFE in the design of systems and processes is neglected.) At the industry level, separate national policies are being discussed and implemented for specific industries in separate initiatives. At the company level engineers and other technical experts work on changing production systems separately from occupational health and safety (OHS) experts.

In Finland, Industry 4.0 is fully technology-driven, and attention to the human factor at work is fully driven by occupational health and safety. For example, the guideline of the Ministry of Social Affairs and Health intends to help Finnish companies with health and safety issues only but is not taking into account optimizing the interfaces between humans and the other parts of the manufacturing process for improving the performance of the entire system, humans included. The same holds for the health-driven activities proposed in The Occupational health 2025 – In cooperation workability and health.

We can also wonder if the “Work 2030” vision and strategy take an integrative approach to link technology, economy, and human factors for enhancing the cooperation and development between these three core actors in the industry. The skill of HFE makes it possible to combine all needed collaborators and stakeholders together for integrating the HFE into engineering and management work. As a multidisciplinary field, HFE is a must and while respecting the identity of different fields we need to recognize the existing barriers to be able to do cooperation between different fields of knowledge.

The policy is needed for combining technologies, business, and people in workplaces

As a production system consists of all activities that are either produced by humans or by machines, the design of a production system is about designing both activities in concert. This means that even when technologies and digitalization are made for improving the performance of the manufacturing process, humans make the final impact on how things will go in reality – in good or bad. System performance can only be realized while taking into account the human factor. If human factors and ergonomics (HFE) are not orchestrated professionally in companies, large-scale negative effects are created in the whole society on the company and national level.

A ‘human factors’, the HFE approach ensures a fit between humans, technology, and the entire production process. It maximizes system performance while maintaining good standards of ergonomics. It means that systems, work, and works environment are realized for maximizing what technology can do, and what people can and want to do. In this approach technology, organizational and human expertise are combined and optimized for maximum output in terms of the economic and social goals of the system. International evidence shows that designing work processes in such a way can serve both goals simultaneously.

How can this be realized in Finland? What is our policy that combines the development of performance of the production processes and well-being of workers at the same time?

The Finnish Human Factors Engineering way  

What is the status in companies of the integration of HFE in the design and management while preparing for Industry 4.0? Now, according to the law, OHS-driven activity is a must for companies. In Finland, occupational health services and professionals help companies to develop the workability of the workers and ensure healthy and safe work environments. They focus on optimizing the load of the work for the worker throughout the whole work process and the work life. Good so far, but how will this be possible without HFE expertise in an era of Industry 4.0 where human-system integration is essential? HFE refers to Ergo Nomos = Work Laws of nature which is the science and theory for designing work processes. This internationally accepted definition of HFE and ergonomics is largely absent in Finland. Companies do not get this HFE knowledge from current OHS services and professionals when searching for and choosing new solutions to modern Industry 4.0 production. In Finish public opinion there is a common understanding that occupational health services offer ‘ergonomists for workplaces’, but this idea of ergonomics is limited to the health and safety of workers, and does not deal with system performance.

On the positive side, the Finnish law recognizes the difference between OHS professionals and OHS experts. The physiotherapist is one of the OHS professionals and the ergonomist is the OHS expert. However, the OHS field does not make a distinction between physiotherapists (who is called `occupational physiotherapists ‘in public) and ergonomist. In Finland `Occupational physiotherapist` represents narrow health and safety based definition of ergonomics. This has led to the situation that companies get most often an occupational physiotherapist for tackling true ergonomics issues instead of the ergonomics (HFE) expert that is mentioned in the law. This is an obvious problem in the Finnish work life at the moment. For these reasons, the multidisciplinary approach to the development of working life is thin from the broader system perspective.

Ergonomics is a science, theory and principles that takes a system approach and deal with the interfaces between human and other parts of the system. This means engineering kind of work for optimizing the work for human. HFE takes into account the physical, cognitive and organizational aspects of the work and work system. This approach is helping to integrate human via HFE knowledge as a part of the process proactively on macro and micro levels. In Finland, unfortunately, we see only reactive micro level OHS activity because of health problems of the workers. We cannot survive a long time with this kind of one sided and siloed OHS approach with health and medicine sciences. We need a national level policy that notice the need for fixing the gap between OHS activities and performance and productivity development activities in companies and public sector organizations for combining HFE and performance knowledge.

Figure 1. The Gap problem. Source: Jan Dul´s lecture in ERGO2030 Webinar, in the Palace, Helsinki, Wednesday 10.11.2021.

Innovations for integrating HFE for improving performance of the companies

For being able to succeed in this change in the industry for ensuring the competitiveness of our companies, the productivity of the work, and wellbeing at work, we need an integrated policy that leads OHS, HFE experts, and performance developers to define the performance factors to be noticed, studied, analyzed and designed for ensuring the fit between human and work system. It is good to be aware that part of the recent poor productivity development of work in Finland is due to poor human ergonomics knowledge in design. Solving this big problem needs understanding of the system approach where existing theories and practices are offered to the use of the companies in this industry and technology change process.                                                                                       

ERGO 2030 project brought as an example, facts and factors to be noticed for this systemic and organizational approach by creating a road map to be utilized in different industries and companies. However, this roadmap does not help unless we do not have a policy in Finland that facilitate the OHS and business/technology actors to work together and especially if the education and services of design ergonomics for work systems are not in place and available for companies and technology suppliers.

Let`s bring the key stakeholders around this topic of human, work, productivity, and well-being at work at the same table and listen to the needs and requirements for creating a mutual understanding how shall the national level roadmap looks like for ensuring the capability of our industry and wellbeing of the workers at work. In another case, we are not able to implement efficient digital and new technology transformation in the industry. This negative alternative will lead us to very slow organizational adaptation processes in industries, low work productivity levels, and to huge negative externalities to society. This big financial cost and bill will be paid by taxpayers.

And last but not least. Industry 5.0 is said to be human-centered but can it be realized without having HFE in place in Industry 4.0? The answer is `no`. Using HFE skills already in Industry 4.0 phase makes us better prepared for Industry 5.0 phase. If this is not taken into account now problems maybe even bigger in industry 5.0 what comes to HFE and phenomena related to that in work-life practices.

Jan Dul
Professor, Rotterdam School of Management, Erasmus University, the Netherlands

Jari Kaivo-oja
Research Director, Finland Futures Research Centre, University of Turku


About the ERGO 2030 project

ERGO2030 project was funded by the Anita and Olavi Seppänen Memorial Foundation, founded in 2018 in Helsinki, Finland. The Foundation actively supports Finnish art and culture, and national orthopedic research as well as maintains the historic church and its environment of Tuupovaara in Eastern Finland.

ERGO 2030 report was published in 2021: Reiman, A., Parviainen, E., Lauraéus, T., Takala, E-P., & Kaivo-oja, J. (2021) ERGO 2030 – a roadmap for human consideration in the design and application of new technologies in industry. Tutu ePublications 3/2021: https://www.utupub.fi/handle/10024/152322

About the authors

Professor Jan Dul is a professor of Technology and Human Factors at the Rotterdam School of Management, Erasmus University, the Netherlands. He has a background in the technical, the medical and the social sciences. His is a specialist in human factors and ergonomics (HFE) and studies the interaction between people and the physical and social-organizational environment to maximize business performance and human well-being. His research contributes to the design of successful products and services, and to the development of work environments for high performance (creativity, innovation, productivity, quality, health and safety). He is the winner of several national and international awards including the Human Factors NL award, the Hal W. Hendrick Distinguished International Colleague Award of the USA human factors and ergonomics society, the IEA Distinguished Service Award of the International Ergonomics Society, and the Liberty Mutual award for the paper ‘A strategy for human factors/ergonomics: developing the discipline and profession’. He has advised the EU and national governments about work environment policies, is a regular speaker at management events worldwide, and has shared his insights with companies on how to improve performance with HFE.

Dr. Jari Kaivo-oja is an Adjunct Professor and Research Director working at the Finland Futures Research Centre, University of Turku. He is a researcher in the Manufacturing 4.0 project funded by the Strategic Research Council of the Academy Finland. He was scientific expert in the ERGO2030 project. He has worked in various European research and development projects serving among others the European Foundation for the Improvement of Living and Working Conditions (European Foundation/Eurofound), the European Agency for Safety and Health at Work (EU OSHA), the European Commission, the European Parliament and the EU DG Enterprise and Industry (DG-ENTR).

Articles

  • Reiman, A., Kaivo-oja, J., Parviainen, E., Takala, E-P. & Lauraeus, T. (2021). Human factors and ergonomics in manufacturing in the Industry 4.0 context – A scoping review. Technology in Society. 65, https://doi.org/10.1016/j.techsoc.2021.101572
  • Reiman, A., Kaivo-oja, J., Parviainen, E. Lauraeus, T. & Takala, E-P. ”Human work in Industry 4.0: A road map to technological changes in manufacturing”. Journal manuscript in review 

Chapters:

  • Reiman, A., Kaivo-oja, J., Parviainen, E. Lauraeus, T. & Takala, E-P. ”Human Work in the Manufacturing Industry 4.0”. Book chapter in review for textbook: Operator 4.0 by Springer.
  • Takala, E-P. & Reiman, A. Ergonomia. Article to Fysiatria. 6. edition 2023. Duodecim.

Conference papers:

  • Takala, E-P., Reiman, A., Parviainen, E., Lauraeus, T. & Kaivo-oja, J. (2021). ERGO 2030 – A roadmap for the implementation of human factors within the newest technology. In: Black, N., Neumann, P.W., Dewis, C. & Noy, I. (Eds.), Book of Extended Abstracts, 21st Congress of the International Ergonomics Association, Vancouver, Canada, 14-18 June 2021, pp. 389-392.

The final ERGO report:

  • Reiman, A., Parviainen, E., Lauraéus, T., Takala, E-P., & Kaivo-oja, J. (2021) ERGO 2030 – tiekartta ihmisen huomioimiseen suunniteltaessa ja sovellettaessa uutta teknologiaa teollisuudessa. Tutu eJulkaisuja 3/2021: https://www.utupub.fi/handle/10024/152322 

Picture Stefan Keller Pixabay